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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if offsets are an effective means of 
second-tier countries acquiring technology and if offsets enhance their ability in 
establishing and maintaining an industrial base capable of producing high-technology 
ch was an analysis of 
rough the 
ctors that lead to the 
successful or unsuccessful establishment and maintenance of an indigenous defense 
utilization of 
d the technology 
at utilize offsets to 
while countries that utilize offsets to integrate their industry within the global arms 
ma ket as a niche supplier have been successful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
weapons for use indigenously and for export.  Included in the resear
factors that lead to the successful or unsuccessful technology transfer th
utilization of offsets.   Additionally, the research analyzed the fa
industrial base through the utilization of offsets.  It was concluded that the 
offsets to achieve technology transfer has not substantially improve
levels of the buyer’s defense industrial base.  Furthermore, countries th
establish an autarkic defense industry capable of independent production rarely succeed 
r
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1 
An Analysis of Second-tier Country Offset Policies: Technology 
Transfer and Defense Industrial Base Establishment 
 
 
 
A common practice that has developed in international arms trade over the past 
thr as: 
that commits the seller 
firm to provide technology, to procure locally produced components, or to 
irms in the 
lly necessary to 
Bitzinger and Kim (2005), in their study of why small countries produce arms, developed 
s.  First-tier arms-
nse industries that 
ducing countries 
represent industrially advanced countries with smaller defense industries than the first-
ith the first-tier 
ry limited and 
pete in 
the global arms market although they do sometimes export low-grade arms to third-world 
Second-tier arms producing countries frequently see offsets as a magic bullet that 
will permit their defense industry to achieve a great leap forward in capability and 
 
I. Introduction 
ee decades is the use of offsets, which Mowery (2007:85) defined 
a provision in an international export transaction 
provide other forms of technical and other assistance to f
purchaser nation that go beyond those deemed economica
support the sale. 
a three-tier framework to categorize weapons-producing countrie
producing countries dominate the global arms market with large defe
possess highly advanced defense technology.  Second-tier arms-pro
tier countries.  While the level of sophistication of the second-tier countries is lower than 
the first-tier countries, their level of sophistication can be on par w
countries in niche areas.  Third-tier arms-producing countries have ve
technologically insufficient defense industries; therefore, they are unable to com
countries. 
 
 
2 
capacity.  Additionally, these countries see technology transfer from the offset provider to 
the domestic defense industry as a primary means of propelling the industry forward.  
ries believe they 
efense needs and 
s-trade 
market. 
Second-tier arms producing countries tend to rely on offsets in spite of a lack of 
co d.  While the use of 
ets is voluminous; 
professionals from academia, government, and industry performed extensive research and 
nsitivity and the 
at are difficult to 
ctory, often due to 
the interests and/or perspective of the writer.  Therefore, the goal of this research was to 
 country offset policies 
n and utilization in promoting the establishment and 
ma
This chapter provides an introductory background on offsets by establishing an 
ment.  Once the background on offsets is established, the 
chapter defines the problem statement.  Finally, the chapter closes with a summary of the 
methodology used for this research effort. 
Finally, with a robust defense industrial base, the leaders of these count
will enhance the ability of the defense industry to support national d
improve the nation’s defense industry competitiveness in the international arm
nclusive evidence indicating offsets are an effective means to an en
offsets is a relatively recent phenomenon, the existing literature on offs
have written at length concerning the topic.  However, the lack of public disclosure of 
data on offset agreements and transactions due to government se
proprietary nature of offets have led to conclusions and results th
validate.  Additionally, conclusions and results are frequently contradi
analyze the existing literature regarding the efficacy of second-tier
related to technology acquisitio
intenance of a defense industrial base. 
offsets framework and discussing the stated offset goals of technology transfer and 
defense industrial base establish
 
 
3 
Background 
The U.S. Department of Commerce (2007b) cites the 1960s  as the first time 
ere used in international arms trade when the United States (U.S.) successfully 
pr  for the foreign 
provisions became an increasingly common element in international trade, especially 
reated an 
asingly demanding offsets.  
tes that offsets 
have been a main characteristic of the international arms trade landscape. 
ent, indicating 
 relation to other 
tem price.  During 
roughly 20 countries, employed offsets as a component of arms trade among its member 
 participates in the 
reventing, 2007).  
han the quality of the 
weapon system sold or weapon system price, is often the determining factor in a 
 attractive offset 
package to purchasing countries is “an essential part of doing business overseas” for the 
defense industry (Wayne, 2003). Finally, the value of offset agreements in relation to 
offsets w
essured West Germany to purchase U.S. weapons to compensate
exchange costs of stationing U.S. military personnel in West Germany.  By 1970, offset 
concerning U.S. arms exports.  However, the end of the Cold War c
international political environment that led to countries incre
Thus, from that time forward, the Department of Commerce (2007) sta
The available data on offsets validates the department’s statem
offsets have become more prevalent, have gained importance in
competitive factors, and have increased in value relative to weapon sys
the Cold War, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), consisting of 
countries.  Today, over 130 countries, or virtually every nation that
international arms market, demand offsets from weapons sellers (P
Additionally, the perceived value of the offset package, rather t
purchasing country’s contract award decision (Stone, 2007a).  As stated by Kent Kresa, 
former chief executive of Northrop Grumman, the ability to offer an
 
 
4 
weapon systems purchase price has risen consistently since the end of the Cold War.  The 
latest offset figures released by the Department of Commerce (2007) show the value of 
creased an average 
 that period, offsets 
Offset policies for most second-tier arms-producing countries seek to enable the 
tra and establish and 
iterature indicates 
U.S. interagency team consulted with various countries receiving offsets during its 
ense 
ulted was that it is 
 offsets are more 
offset policies, these countries are unclear whether those policies result in net benefits or 
los
g that “most nations 
hether they gain or 
lose from them in the aggregate.”  Sköns (2002:6) states there is a disparity between 
economic effects 
of offsets).”  She goes on to state that “little is known about the actual, in contrast to 
expected, economic implications of offsets” (Sköns, 2002:6).  Finally, Brauer and Dunne 
offset agreements in relation to the value of defense export contracts in
of 2.5 percent per year between 1993 and 2005.  Additionally, during
represented 71.2 percent of the value of the export contract. 
nsfer of technology from weapons sellers to the domestic industry 
maintain a domestic defense industrial base.  However, the existing l
the efficacy of offsets in achieving these goals remains indeterminate.  For instance, a 
investigation of ways to mitigate the adverse affects of offsets on the U.S. def
industrial base; the team found that “the consensus of the nations cons
very hard to determine whether the benefits or adverse effects of
dominant” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007a:4-15).  Therefore, despite having 
ses for their country. 
Markusen (2006:3) came to a similar conclusion when notin
and firms participating in or tolerating offsets are uncertain as to w
“what countries actually expect (their reason for seeking offsets) and what can be 
expected more realistically (what the literature says about the possible 
 
 
5 
(2007c:6) note, “very few countries have ever carried out even a single formal and 
independent offset-contract audit to determine to what degree, if any, the hopes with 
stract topic to all but 
s.  Therefore, this study will begin by 
providing solid background information of major issues concerning offsets , document 
dation for an 
tives (i.e., technology 
 
ework
which offset contracts are invested come to fruition.” 
However, defense offsets is a broad, highly complex, and ab
those who deal with them on a regular basi
their importance, and provide a knowledge baseline to act as the foun
analysis of second-tier weapons-producing countries’ offset objec
transfer and defense industrial base establishment and maintenance). 
Offsets Fram  
roceeds from arms 
ctors.  Offsets are 
hey are market-
distorting agreements that go beyond those deemed economically necessary to support 
overnment controlled 
uction, licensed 
stment, technology transfer, and 
countertrade, which entails barter, counter-purchase, and buyback. 
:  those that 
ar ended.  During 
the Cold War, weapons exporting nations, typically the United States, utilized offsets as a 
foreign policy tool to improve national security by increasing the industrial and military 
Offsets are agreements that obligate the seller to reinvest the p
sales in the purchasing country in both the defense and commercial se
obligations and are not optional nor voluntary on the part of the seller.  T
the sale.  The buyer is unequivocally a governmental agency or a g
firm.  Finally, the methods to implement offsets are through coprod
production, subcontractor production, overseas inve
Existing literature divides offsets into two historical timeframes
occurred during the Cold War and those that occurred after the Cold W
 
 
6 
capabilities of its allies (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007b).   The motivation behind 
this policy was the understanding that “nations tend to align politically, economically, 
emer and Sain, 
 arms trade following 
way to improve their country’s economic and industrial competitiveness in the global 
ing the end of the 
tivational transformation can be explained by the 
peace dividend as countries around the world significantly reduced their defense budgets 
, reduced the 
side.  The reduced 
stry, created what 
was able to extract extraordinary demands in return for agreeing to purchase weapons 
vironment, weapons 
es of winning a 
re, offsets became, and continue to be, an important element 
in the international arms trade market. 
ight 
e demand the 
highest level of offsets from the seller.  However, offsets do not come without cost to the 
importing country.  Conceptually, an offset is a cost-free compensatory benefit provided 
and diplomatically with other nations with whom they trade arms” (Kr
1992:31). Although this motivation remained a tenet of international
the end of the Cold War, a shift occurred as importing nations began to see offsets as a 
economy.  Therefore, offsets became an economic policy tool follow
Cold War in addition to a foreign policy tool. 
The impetus behind this mo
as the end of the geopolitical struggle against communism, or capitalism
necessity to heavily arm standing armies to repel invasion from either 
demand, coupled with an overcapacity of the international defense indu
is termed a buyer’s market.  This buyer’s market created an environment where the buyer 
from exporting nations (Stone, 2007b).  In this highly competitive en
exporters had to offer attractive offset packages to improve their chanc
sale (Waller, 2003).  Therefo
Given the perceived benefits of offsets for the purchasing country, one m
assume the purchasing country has nothing to lose and should therefor
 
 
7 
to the purchasing country in return for agreeing to purchase arms from the arms seller.  
However, offsets are costly, and therefore, must be paid for by one of the parties (Bulgin, 
the seller.  In spite 
because they 
2007).  However, as stated earlier, whether the benefits outweigh the costs is not clear. 
Technology Transfer
2007).  Research indicates that the buyer pays for the offsets and not 
of this, governments in the past have been willing to pay the extra cost 
perceived the benefits of the offset program outweighed the increased cost (Bulgin, 
 
 
. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (2007b:1-5) 
defines technology transfer as:  
ent and that 
d abroad, 
nture of overseas 
ial arrangement 
foreign entity. 
through the acquisition of technology from first-tier countries considered to be leaders in 
gical capabilities, 
ophisticated weapons 
l arms market 
(Waller, 2003).  Therefore, the goal is to gain a level of independence in the production 
of weapon system e industry products in 
Whether offset policies aimed at promoting technology transfer succeed in 
achieving those goals is unclear.  More so, it is unclear if technology transfer occurs at a 
The U.S
Transfer of technology that occurs because of an offset agreem
may take the form of research and development conducte
technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint ve
investment, or other activities under direct commerc
between the defense prime contractor and a 
 
Predominately, second-tier countries seek to improve their technological capabilities 
state-of-the-art technologies.  Ultimately, by improving their technolo
second-tier countries seek to improve their ability to manufacture s
systems and increase their level of competitiveness in the internationa
s and to improve the marketability of their defens
the international arms market. 
 
 
8 
significant level.  Literature on the efficacy of second-tier country offset policies in 
promoting technology transfer from first-tier countries shows mixed findings at best; 
auer and Dunne 
t in significant 
successfully transferred, second-tier industries failed to acquire the needed capabilities to 
nological 
olm International Peace 
r countries to keep 
pace with first-tier technological advances by noting “whatever technology is transferred 
oncluded in their 
er arms-producing 
states in terms of 
technological innovation and implementation.”  These findings suggest that efforts to 
utilize the technology to improve the capabilities of 
the defense industry have not been successful. 
Defense Industrial Base Establishment and Maintenance
however, the results are predominately negative.  For example, Br
(2007c:1) found “virtually no case where offset arrangements resul
technology transfers.”  Another study found that even though technologies were 
close the technology gap with first-tier countries or keep pace with tech
development in weapon systems (2004).  Research from Stockh
Research Institute (SIPRI, 2008) reinforces the inability of second-tie
is quickly outpaced by global technology advances, especially in the United States” 
(Hagelin et al., 2006:A-1).  Finally, Bitzinger and Kim (2005:205) c
case study on South Korean weapons production policy that “second-ti
countries…continue to lag far behind the first-tier industrialized 
promote technology transfer and to 
 
 
ent and 
ries in demanding 
offsets.  The primary motivations for establishing and maintaining a defense industrial 
base are improving national security and the balance of trade.  Second-tier countries view 
In addition to technology transfer, defense industrial base establishm
maintenance is a primary goal of second-tier weapons-producing count
 
 
9 
defense industrial capability as an important element of national security; by achieving a 
level of independence in weapons production capability, these countries rationalize that 
ce Minister 
urity that each 
 of this belief 
stems from the fact some countries see defense industrial capability as a countermeasure 
 dependence of 
).  Thus, by reducing 
ntry can formulate 
and follow foreign policy independent of outside influence.  
 the international 
ts and imports.  A 
importing.  Two elements of a country’s offset strategy enable a country to improve the 
g country and 
e National Defense 
offset agreements force 
the weapons exporter to transfer work generated by the arms sale to the importing 
potential is another method to improve the balance of trade.  The U.S. Department of 
Commerce (2007a) states, by moving jobs, investment, and technology from the seller to 
they also achieve a greater level of security.  Former Brazilian Air For
Macedo validated this view when he declared, “it is a condition of sec
nation manufacture its own armaments” (Perlo-Freeman, 2007:4).  Part
to the political influence exerted by foreign countries that leverage the
second-tier countries on weapons imports (Bitzinger and Kim, 2005
its weapons supply dependence from foreign production sources, a cou
In addition to achieving security and foreign policy independence, second-tier 
countries view defense industrial capability as a means to improve
balance of trade.  A country’s balance of trade is its balance of expor
positive balance indicates a country is exporting a greater value of goods than it is 
balance of trade: work transfer created by the arms deal to the importin
improving the export potential of the indigenous defense industry.  Th
Industrial Association (NDIA) (Background, 2007) found many 
country resulting in an improvement in the balance of trade.  Improving the export 
 
 
10 
the buyer’s country, the buyer seeks to improve the export potential of its defense 
industry by becoming more competitive in the international arms trade market. 
licies in promoting 
s findings similar to that of 
prom
efficacy in promoting the establishment and maintenance of a defense industrial base can 
national defense 
), stated offsets had 
ion.  Additionally, 
Hagelin et al. (2006) found that offsets had not advanced the long-term industry viability 
stablishment and 
it of many second-
ain are 
now dependent on state aid for survival.  The Brazilian experience highlights the failure 
.  Brazil had used 
y the early 1990s, 
eared from the international 
landscape (Bitzinger, 2003).  Taiwan, another benefactor of offsets, recently 
d or reduced” 
(Bitzinger, 2003:39).  State dependence for industrial survival provides another indication 
of the failure of offsets to produce viable defense industries through offset programs.  
Literature on the efficacy of second-tier country offset po
defense industrial base establishment and maintenance provide
oting technology transfer – the results are predominately negative.  Measures of 
be analyzed by measuring job levels and the long-term viability of the 
industry.  Numerous sources, according to Brauer and Dunne (2007a
not created substantial or sustainable job growth in the purchasing nat
of countries receiving the offsets. 
Further indication of the failure of offsets to promote the e
maintenance of second-tier defense industries is evidenced by the ex
tier weapons-producing countries from the defense industry; and those that rem
of offsets to establish a defense industrial base in the recipient country
defense offsets extensively since the 1970s (Perlo-Freeman, 2007).  B
however, the Brazilian defense industry had virtually disapp
acknowledged the futility of remaining in the defense industry when stating that “the 
original plan for independent production of weapons must be stoppe
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Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and South Korea, all of whom participated 
extensively in offset programs, are now heavily dependent on state aid for survival 
 competitive in the 
Problem Statement 
-tier weapons-producing countries routinely demand offsets.  These 
co gy transfer and defense 
ature seems to 
indicate second-tier countries do not consistently meet these goals (e.g., Brauer and 
m (2005), 
h investigates the 
e industrial base 
s 
and failure in achieving the goals. 
Re
cing countries are 
numerous, the researcher found technology transfer and defense industrial base 
is research will 
country offset policies in 
achieving these goals and will seek to determine the factors that lead to their success or 
failure.  Specifically, this research will attempt to answer the following questions: 
(Brauer and Dunne, 2007b).  Furthermore, their products are not
international arms market. 
 
Second
untries commonly tailor offsets agreements to achieve technolo
industrial base establishment and maintenance.  However, existing liter
Dunne (2007a, 2007b, and 2007c), Hagelin et al. (2006), Bitzinger and Ki
Perlo-Freeman (2007), Bitzinger (2003)).  Therefore, this researc
efficacy of offsets in enabling technology transfer and defens
establishment and maintenance.  The research then analyzes factors that lead to succes
 
search Questions 
While the offset policy goals of second-tier arms-produ
establishment and maintenance as the two dominant goals.  Therefore, th
attempt to determine the efficacy of second-tier arms-producing 
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1. What are the characteristics of the global arms market structure that 
impact offset policy formulation and/or success? 
2. What economic and political factors influence the formulation and/or 
3. What are the characteristics of second-tier arms-producing countries that 
 policy? 
ed? 
 
Methodology 
his research utilized historical, documentary, and case study methodologies. 
Ac  evaluation, and 
synthesis of the existing data into an accurate description of the topic.  Documentary 
ction, evaluation, 
 to longitudinal in 
iled analysis of a 
f select second-
tier weapons-producing and exporting countries.  The literature review employed the 
nd on the offset issue 
logy.  The case study 
mentary 
methodology, allowed the researcher to study offsets as they interact with the policies of 
the individual countries, the cases. 
 
success of offset policy? 
might influence the success or failure of their offset
4. What are the characteristics of the technology transferr
T
cording to Lang (1984), historical methodology is the collection,
methodology is similar to historical in that it also involves data colle
and synthesis.  However, Lang notes, it is cross-sectional as opposed
nature.   Finally, Lang describes case study methodology as the deta
research subject.  In the case of this thesis, the research subjects consist o
historical and documentary methodology.  It provided the backgrou
and set the stage for the introduction of the case study methodo
methodology, which utilized data gathered through historical and docu
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Limitations 
There were inherent limitations in the methodologies used in this thesis.  When 
storical, documentary, and case study methodologies, it is necessary for the 
res to continually guard 
on the thesis topic.  Thus, the researcher performed an exhaustive search of primary and 
ing the sources 
ical criticisms.   
Importance of Topic 
econd-
he results of this 
ir offset programs 
lly, this research 
is important to the U.S. government as well as its defense industry.  Knowledge of 
and the factors 
s or failure will permit government and industry leaders formulate 
appropriate policy in response. 
 
 the subject of offsets 
by documenting the importance of the topic and providing a knowledge baseline from 
which the offset policies and objectives of second-tier weapons-producing countries 
using hi
earcher to verify the accuracy and truthfulness of the sources and 
against bias and prejudice compromising the need for a professional, critical perspective 
secondary sources and verified the accuracy of the data by crosscheck
along with verifying the legitimacy of the source by utilizing histor
 
This research is important to second-tier weapons-producing countries.  S
tier countries dedicate a great deal of resources towards offsets.  T
research will enable these countries to evaluate the effectiveness of the
and provide recommendations to improve their effectiveness.  Additiona
second-tier countries efficacy in achieving stated goals through offsets 
that lead to their succes
Overview 
Chapter II presents an overview of the current literature on
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regarding technology transfer and the establishment and maintenance of a defense 
industrial base can be analyzed.  Therefore, Chapter II discusses the definition and 
tructure, offsets in the 
fense industrial base 
ethodology used in 
this research as well as limitations of the methodology.  Chapter IV provides analysis and 
icacy of second-
quisition and 
re of these countries in 
acquiring and utilizing technology through offsets.  Next, the chapter provides an analysis 
romoting the 
ed by factors that 
 defense industrial 
recommendations.  
 
history of offsets, offset characteristics, the global arms market s
global arms market, technology acquisition and utilization, and de
establishment and maintenance.  Chapter III identifies the research m
results of the research.  First, the chapter provides an analysis of the eff
tier arms-producing country offset policies in enabling technology ac
utilization followed by factors that determine the success or failu
of the efficacy of second-tier arms-producing country offset policies in p
establishment and maintenance of a defense industrial base follow
determine the success or failure of these countries in utilizing offsets in
base establishment and maintenance.  Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions and 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Defense offsets is a broad, highly complex, and abstract topic.  Therefore, this 
research first sought to provide detailed background information on the topic in the 
literature review.  The intent is to docum of the topic but to 
provide a knowledge baseline from which the analysis of offset policies and objectives of 
o technology 
e research conducts a 
ajor issues 
concerning offsets as they impact the study.  Therefore, this chapter is divided into the 
lobal 
y acquisition and 
 maintenance.   
 
Defining Offsets 
nsidered an offset 
unne (2007c:1) 
invest (‘offset’) 
arms sales proceeds in the purchasing country.”  Healey (1999) reinforces the obligatory 
 nature of offset 
agreements is the product of laws, regulations, or expectations of the purchasing country 
that mandate offsets or the competitive forces of the arms market that dictate offsets.  The 
ent not only the importance 
second-tier arms-producing countries can proceed.  Prior to delving int
transfer and defense industrial base establishment issues though, th
detailed literature review in which background material is limited to m
following sections: defining offsets, history of offsets, offset characteristics, the g
arms market structure, offsets in the global arms market, technolog
utilization, and defense industrial base establishment and
The literature contained numerous definitions of what is co
which were used to develop an operational definition.  Brauer and D
define offsets as agreements in arms trade that “obligate the seller to re
nature of offsets by noting offsets are obligations rather than optional or voluntary 
agreements on the part of the seller; he further notes that the obligatory
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U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2004) discusses the reinvestment aspect 
of offsets by noting the seller reinvests the proceeds from arms sales in the purchasing 
benefits come in 
sing country, 
arketing 
assistance of the buyer’s goods and services unrelated to the arms sale, financial 
hasing country’s 
A key element from Mowery’s (2007) definition of offets is missing from the 
above discussion.  Recall that he defined offsets as: 
mits the seller 
omponents, or to 
to firms in the 
ally necessary to 
, 2007:85) 
e benefits that “go 
beyond those deemed economically necessary to support the sale.”  This omission is 
te that this element of 
n the arms-trade 
sion of benefits 
provided in the absence of economic necessity, and outside the control of free-market 
ic 
gnificantly influences 
the structure of the arms-trade environment.  A U.S. presidential commission analyzing 
the future of the U.S. aerospace industry validates the impact of offsets on the free 
country through defense industrial and/or commercial benefits.  Those 
the form of subcontracting opportunities for companies in the purcha
coproduction agreements, technology transfer from the seller to the buyer, m
assistance, and numerous other investment activities in the purc
economy. 
a provision in an international export transaction that com
firm to provide technology, to procure locally produced c
provide other forms of technical and other assistance 
purchaser nation that go beyond those deemed economic
support the sale.  (Mowery
The missing element is the fact that offsets commit the seller to provid
common in the existing literature.  However, it is important to no
offsets is due to the way offsets interfere with free-market forces i
environment.  As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the provi
forces, creates market distortions in the arms-trade environment that lead to econom
inefficiencies and inefficient industrial policy.  Furthermore, it si
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market, describing offsets as a “form of market distortion in global aerospace trade” 
(Presidential Commission, 2002).  Therefore, as an operational definition is constructed, 
finition. 
 is a description of 
ent to be an offset, the 
buyer must be a governmental agency or a government controlled firm.  The Defense 
…between the U.S. 
)” (GAO, 1994:19).  
er forms of 
international arms agreements such as agreements between commercial interests.  
te offsets.  Taylor 
inting out that an 
ents are 
more appropriately termed international cooperative programs (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2007a).   
Im
it is vital to include the market-distorting nature of offsets in the de
A second element missing from Brauer and Dunne’s definition
the buyer in the offset agreement.  Unequivocally, for the agreem
Offsets Commission agrees by stating that “an offset ‘agreement’ is
exporter and the foreign government (or its state-controlled company
Including this aspect of offsets in an operational definition excludes oth
Therefore, agreements between commercial interests (i.e., between two defense 
companies not controlled or owned by the government) do not constitu
(2007c) agrees in his assessment of what constitutes an offset by po
agreement between two private firms does not qualify as an offset.  These agreem
 
plementation Methods 
various methods used to implement offsets.  Verzariu (2000) lists the various m
implement offsets as co-product
The final task in providing an operational definition of offsets is to describe the 
ethods to 
ion, licensed production, subcontractor production, 
overseas investment, technology transfer, and countertrade.  Each of these areas is briefly 
described in the remainder of this section. 
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Co-production.  Overseas production that permits a foreign government or 
producer to acquire the technical information to manufacture all or part of an article 
or y exports is based upon a 
government licensed 
ents 
by U.S. manufacturers. Coproduction in nonmilitary exports is based on an agreement 
iginating in the seller country. Co-production related to militar
government-to-government agreement. It includes government-to-
production and excludes licensed production based upon direct commercial arrangem
contracted directly between exporter and importer. 
Licensed Production.  Overseas production of an article originating in the seller 
co mercial 
arrangements between a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or producer. 
untry based upon transfer of technical information under direct com
Subcontractor Production.  Overseas production of a part or com
article originating in the seller country. The subcontract does not ne
license of technical information and is usually a direct commercial arra
the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign producer. 
ponent of an 
cessarily involve 
ngement between 
Overseas Investment.  Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the 
 of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign 
co
form
untry. 
Technology Transfer.  Transfer of technology that occurs as a
abroad, technical assistance provid
 result of an offset 
agreement and that may take the following forms: research and development conducted 
ed to the subsidiary or joint venture of overseas 
investment, or other activities under direct commercial arrangement between the U.S. 
manufacturer and a foreign entity. 
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Countertrade.  In addition to the types of offset defined above, various types of 
commercial countertrade arrangements may be required as part of offset commitments. 
Th  is a one-time 
hange of selected 
ent by 
the initial exporter to buy (or to find a buyer for) a specific value of goods (often stated as 
ter during a 
greement by the 
erived from the original 
exported product. 
 
inition
ey may include one or more of the following mechanisms.  Barter
transaction only, bound under a single contract, that specifies the exc
goods or services for another of equivalent value.  Counterpurchase is an agreem
a percentage of the value of the original export) from the original impor
specified time period.  Finally, compensation (or buyback) is an a
original exporter to accept as full or partial repayment products d
Operational Def  
ed to include the 
s sales proceeds 
in the purchasing country; they are obligations and are not optional nor voluntary on the 
 and commercial 
nts that go beyond 
buyer is unequivocally a 
governmental agency or a government controlled firm.  Finally, the methods to 
ction, licensed production, subcontractor 
production, overseas investment, technology transfer, and countertrade, which entails 
barter, counter-purchase, and buyback. 
 
Thus, the operational definition of offsets can be consider
elements.  Offsets are agreements that obligate the seller to reinvest arm
part of the seller.  Offset reinvestment takes place in both the defense
sectors of the buying country.  Offsets are market-distorting agreeme
those deemed economically necessary to support the sale. The 
implement offsets consist of co-produ
 
 
20 
Direct and Indirect Offsets 
The literature divides offsets into two distinct categories:  direct and indirect.  
ansactions directly related to the weapon sold under the terms of the 
co  to purchase engine 
the terms of the original contract.  Indirect offsets are transactions not related to the 
direct offset is 
et agreement contained in 
oth military and 
civilian based transactions. 
 detailing direct 
f Commerce is the 
uired to submit an 
tical 
data analyzing the activity.  Thus, it is an invaluable source of information for offset 
de, the department 
indirect, or both.  
acting, technology 
transfer, training, production, licensed production, or financing activities; indirect offsets 
orting 
assistance, and technology transfer (2007b).  It is important to note the type of activity, 
such as technology transfer, does not necessarily determine whether an offset is direct or 
Direct offsets are tr
ntract.  An example of a direct offset is Pratt & Whitney agreeing
components manufactured in Poland to install on F-100 engines that Poland bought under 
weapon sold under the terms of the contract.  An example of an in
Lockheed Martin providing submarine technology under an offs
a contract with Poland to purchase F-16s.  Indirect offsets can involve b
Reports issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce provide data
and indirect offset agreements and activities.  The U.S. Department o
focal point for data collection on offsets for the U.S. Congress.  It is req
annual report to Congress detailing offset agreements and activity, along with statis
research.  In its Eleventh Report to Congress on Offsets in Defense Tra
categorizes the different methods to implement offsets as either direct, 
Direct offsets, according to the report, include co-production, subcontr
include purchases, investment, training, financing activities, marketing/exp
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indirect.  Rather, it is determined by whether the offset is related to the weapon sold 
under the terms of the contract. 
 Commerce (2007b) 
s, 39.8 percent of offset transactions by value were direct, 59.5 
percent were indirect, and 0.7 percent were st 60% of offset 
transactions entailed activities not related to the weapon sold under the terms of the 
erce found, 
 predominately 
sets.  Since second-
tier weapons-producing countries typically possess developed economies, the majority of 
s differ in whether 
ore easily absorb 
capability to do so.  Therefore, developed countries, with a higher level of industrial 
fficient levels of 
velopment of their 
 or other areas unrelated to high technology weapon systems purchased 
(Preventing, 2007). 
The literature also divides offsets between two periods: Cold War and post Cold 
War.  During the Cold War, geopolitical concerns and national security implications of 
For the 13-year period (1993-2005) the U.S. Department of
collected data on offset
unspecified.  Thus, almo
contract.  However, it is important to note that the U.S. Department of Comm
in general, countries with developed economies and defense industries
request direct offsets while developing countries request indirect off
second-tier country offset activity falls under direct offsets. 
One of the theories on why developed and developing countrie
they demand direct or indirect offsets is that developed countries can m
technology related to the weapon being sold.  Developing countries do not have the 
development, seek direct offsets and developing countries, with insu
industrial development, seek alternative forms of offsets such as de
infrastructure
 
History of Offsets 
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the confrontation between the East and West dominated international arms trade and, by 
extension, offsets.  Thus, countries traded arms with each other to strengthen their 
aint in their 
of the Cold War, 
arket share and 
domestic defense industry survival.  In addition, following the end of the Cold War, 
r’s contract award 
Cold War Offsets  
respective alliances.  Further, arms-exporting countries exercised restr
participation in international arms trade.  However, with the end 
geopolitical and national security implications became secondary to m
offset agreements became a primary competitive factor in the buye
determination. 
 
 
orld War II to 
. national security 
th its NATO allies 
promoting the reconstruction efforts of Europe (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007a).  
offsets to achieve national 
conomically, and 
ouraging 
European countries to engage in arms trade with the U.S. through the provision of offsets, 
interoperable and standardized weapons but was also able to establish a close alliance 
with its NATO members.  At the same time, the U.S. achieved foreign policy aims by 
The U.S. originated the concept of offsets following the end of W
enhance its national security and foreign policy.  Offsets improved U.S
by allowing the U.S. to achieve interoperability and standardization wi
through the export of American weapons.  Offsets served U.S. foreign policy goals by 
Kremer and Sain (1992: 31) summarized the rationale of using 
security aims by noting that “nations tend to align politically, e
diplomatically with other nations with whom they trade arms.”  By enc
they noted that the U.S. was able to not only provide its European allies with 
 
 
23 
offering offsets.  By establishing production facilities in European countries, the U.S. 
utilized offsets to reconstruct and revitalize their European industrial capability. 
eapons was limited at 
f World War II, European 
industry did not take part 
finished defense goods to quickly reestablish a European military force in Western 
mmunist threat (Lorell, 
to the U.S. goal of 
ally changed its 
approach to rearming Europe by permitting the use of co-production and licensed 
ents.  These 
dustry.  Moreover, 
ly demanded their 
European industry began to play a greater role in arms production through offset 
ag
tablish their defense 
ucing complete 
weapon systems.  Therefore, early offset agreements entailed relatively basic tasks such 
sks such as production 
of components for incorporation into weapon systems (Mowery, 2007).  By the 1970s, 
offsets enabled many European countries to advance to the point where they could 
European industrial participation in the production of U.S. w
first and increased gradually.  Immediately following the end o
in weapons production.  Rather, the United States exported 
Europe capable of assisting the United States in countering the co
2002).  However, exporting finished defense goods did not contribute 
European industrial reconstruction.  Therefore, the United States gradu
production agreements between U.S. defense industry and European governm
agreements proved to be an effective means of revitalizing Europe’s in
they were welcomed by Western European countries who increasing
industries play an increased role in the supply of arms to its military forces.  Thus, 
reements (Ilbas, 2002). 
Offsets proved a valuable tool for European countries to rees
industrial capacity.  Initially, European industry was incapable of prod
as assembling kits provided by foreign firms.  Over time, as the European defense 
industry began to recover, offsets expanded into more complex ta
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independently produce weapon systems to meet many of their military requirements 
(Verzariu, 2000). 
d national security 
ing the end of World War II partly by employing offsets; the NATO alliance 
possessed w roperable with U.S. 
weapons and Europe’s industry had returned to pre-war production levels.  Additionally, 
try that could 
ket and provided 
irements.  In fact, the 
arrival of a technologically sophisticated European defense industry came at a time when 
, autarkic defense 
U.S. to achieve its 
r U.S. weapons 
manufacturers who, by the late 1970s, were competing for sales on the international 
ma
 U.S. were France, 
ntries possessed 
advanced defense industries on par with the United States.  Thus, these countries not only 
erospace.  Combat 
aircraft such as the French Mirage III/5/2000 series, the British/French Jaguar, the 
British/German/Italian Tornado, and the French/German Alpha Jet emerged from 
Thus, the U.S. succeeded in achieving its foreign policy an
goals follow
eapons in its inventory that were standardized and inte
offsets created a technologically sophisticated European defense indus
compete with U.S. weapons manufacturers in the arms export mar
European countries with an alternative source for its military requ
Western European countries were beginning to reject the notion of exclusively using U.S. 
designed arms and embarked on a program to create an indigenous
industrial base (Lorell, 2002).  Therefore, offsets not only allowed the 
foreign policy and national security goals but also created competition fo
rket. 
Countries that benefited the most from offsets provided by the
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy.  By the late 1970s, these cou
sought to produce their own weapons, but also sought to compete with the United States 
for a share of the international arms trade market, especially in a
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factories across Europe.  Although the capabilities of these aircraft were slightly inferior 
to U.S. designed combat aircraft, it became clear that the structure of the global defense 
 aircraft to one that 
cated weapon 
 
Post Cold War Offsets
industry had evolved from one dominated by U.S. and Soviet designed
included European arms producers as a third source of highly sophisti
systems. 
 
nd the international arms trade environment following the end of the 
Co eduction in defense 
spending.  During the Cold War, arms-producing countries exercised restraint in selling 
plications 
ld War came to an 
countries were no 
economic benefit of actively participating in arms trade (Mowery, 2007).  The result was 
. arms producers competed with 
Eu
d that came with the 
end of the Cold War; countries around the world were able to significantly reduce their 
e to a dramatic 
expend a significant 
portion of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense.  Data from the 
International Monetary Fund provides evidence of the reduced defense budgets 
Offsets a
ld War were heavily influenced by increased competition and a r
arms in the international market due to the geopolitical and national security im
of the confrontation between the East and West.  However, as the Co
abrupt halt with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, arms-producing 
longer bound by geopolitical and national security concerns and began to see the 
an international arms trade environment in which U.S
ropean first-tier arms-producing countries for international sales. 
Adding to the competitive environment was the peace dividen
defense budgets when the confrontation between the East and West com
conclusion.  Therefore, countries were no longer compelled to 
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throughout the world following the end of the Cold War.  According to their data, 
worldwide military spending in 1990 was 3.6 percent of world GDP.  Five years later, 
 33% drop (Verzariu, 
d competition as the 
The competition resulting from the emergence of European countries to first-tier 
arm y considerations in 
porting countries 
s market.  A 
buyer’s market is an environment characterized by the existence of more sellers than 
 the ability of the 
r agreeing to buy 
onment where the 
weapons from exporting nations (Stone, 2007b).  In this highly competitive environment, 
 to offer attractive offset packages to improve their chances of 
wi
red a period in which 
the buyer had the upper hand, arms-importing countries intensified their demands for 
y arms-importing 
countries as compensation for buying foreign produced weapons.  The unrelenting 
demand for offsets by arms-importing countries created a situation where the exporting 
worldwide military represented only 2.4 percent of world GDP, a
2000).  The result is the confluence of reduced demand and increase
Cold War ended. 
s-producing status, a reduction in geopolitical and national securit
weapon sales, and a significant reduction in the budgets of weapons im
predicated by the end of the Cold War created what is termed a buyer’
buyers, or reduced demand, resulting in either lower product prices or
buyer to secure favorable or compensatory provisions in exchange fo
from a seller.  Thus, the resulting market power shift created an envir
buyer was able to extract extraordinary demands in return for agreeing to purchase 
weapons exporters had
nning a sale (Waller, 2003). 
Acknowledging the international arms trade market had ente
offsets.  Once a tool utilized predominately by the United States to persuade European 
countries to buy U.S. arms, offsets evolved into a benefit demanded b
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company, faced with foreign demands for offsets in exchange for agreeing to purchase 
arms, felt compelled to comply with the demands lest they risk the loss of the sale to an 
ting aspect of the 
nd U.S. defense companies are in heated 
competitions from export opportunities; many need foreign sales to ensure their survival 
ed to secure sales 
fset 
sets will not go away 
any time soon. 
 
ffsets 
eristics.  First, the 
ents in 
relation to the value of the original contract has increased significantly over time.  Third, 
on has grown in 
rth, foreign 
tor.  Lastly, offsets 
result in an increased price for the arms procurement.  The first three characteristics 
ourth characteristic 
ospace offsets, and the last characteristic shows offsets do 
not come without cost to the recipient country.  Each of these characteristics is further 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
international competitor (Scott, 1999). 
The provision of offsets in a buyer’s market remains a domina
arms-trade environment today.  European a
(Falco, 1998).   Plagued with excess capacity and understanding the ne
in the export market, defense companies are more than willing to offer attractive of
packages to buyers.  Furthermore, they understand that the use of off
Characteristics of O
A review of the literature on offsets reveals numerous charact
use of offsets has increased steadily over time.  Second, the value of offset agreem
the quality and value of the offset package in proposal evaluati
importance relative to price and technical performance criteria.  Fou
governments focus their offset efforts in the defense aerospace sec
establish the importance of offsets in the arms trade environment, the f
highlights the importance of aer
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Increasing Use of Offsets 
The number of countries demanding offsets has increased steadily to the point 
on in arms-sales agreements has become the norm rather than the 
exception.  As stated by Kent Kresa, for an, the 
ability to offer an attractive offset package to purchasing countries is “an essential part of 
ing the Cold War, 
sets.  However, 
 describing their 
requirements to receive offsets (Preventing, 2007).  Verzariu (2000) found the level of 
anded 
, technologically 
s, and developing 
environment, weapons exporters must offer offset packages that are attractive to the 
buyer if they hope to secure export contracts. 
In
where their inclusi
mer chief executive of Northrop Grumm
doing business overseas” for the defense industry (Wayne, 2003).  Dur
members of NATO (roughly 20 countries) predominately received off
over 130 countries currently receive offsets and have offset policies
development in a country, once a factor determining whether or not a country dem
offsets, is no longer a factor.  Countries with highly developed
sophisticated defense industries, those with less developed industrie
countries equally demand offsets in one form or another.  Therefore, in the current 
 
creasing Value of Offsets 
agreements in relation to the value of the export contract has risen steadily over tim
shown in Figure 1.  According to the U.S. Department of Commer
In addition to the prevalence of offsets in arms trade, the value of offset 
e as 
ce (2007b), between 
1993 and 2005, U.S. companies entered into 538 offset agreements, with export sales for 
the original contracts totaling $79.5 billion and the offset agreements totaling $56.6 
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billion, or 71.2% of the export contract value.  In 1993, the first year the Department of 
Commerce collected offset value data, offset agreements were worth 49.3% of the value 
partment of 
 of all offset 
with increasing frequency, the value of the offset agreement exceeds the value of the 
 government of 
 example of this reality.  
ntered into an 
offsets agreement valued at $9.7 billion; the original contract was worth $3.5 billion.  
es the value 
atives, 2004). 
 
of the export contract.  In 2005 alone, the value was 102.9% (U.S. De
Commerce, 2007b).  As the percentage indicates, the cumulative value
agreements during 2005 exceeded the value of the export contracts for that year.  In fact, 
original contract.  The offset agreement signed in 2003 between the
Poland and Lockheed Martin serves as perhaps the most dramatic
As part of Poland’s procurement of 48 F-16 aircraft, Lockheed Martin e
Thus, the government of Poland received an offset agreement worth 2.6 tim
of the original contract (U.S. House of Represent
 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007b) 
Figure 1. Offset Agreement Value/Export Contract Value (Three-Year Moving Average)  
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Offsets Often Determining Factor in Contract Award 
Thus far, the research has shown the number of countries demanding offsets has 
ion in the world that procures weapons from 
fo to the original 
many cases, the determining factor in a country’s contract award decision.  Healy 
ional sales of weapon 
  Price and technical 
rms-trade market 
that exists today, price and technical performance of the competing bidders is often 
hile 
deciding factor in 
is a clear distinction between the price and technical performance of the competing 
ed on the quality 
 the quality and 
 are not as important as the offset package being offered (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2007b). 
9 and 2003, 
respectively.  In 1999, Czechoslovakia sought to replace its aging fleet of fighter aircraft.  
During the competition and selection process, the Czechs placed the majority of their 
risen to the point were virtually every nat
reign countries demands offsets and the value of offsets in relation 
contract value has risen steadily over time.  This section describes how offsets are, in 
(2007:216) lists “four fundamental criteria” upon which internat
systems are won: price, technical performance, politics, and offsets.
performance criteria are self-explanatory.  In the highly competitive a
indistinguishable (Preventing, 2007).  Political influence comes in the form of regional 
favoritism, in-country political forces, and buy-local preferences, among others.  W
politics can be a deciding factor, the value of offset packages is the 
contract award with increasing frequency (Stone, 2007b.).  Furthermore, even when there 
bidders, the importing country is increasingly awarding contracts bas
and quantity of the offsets package.  This indicates that, in many cases,
price of the weapon system
To illustrate the importance of offsets in the selection process, consider 
Czechoslovakia and Poland’s procurement of fighter aircraft in 199
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decision in the area of offsets as indicated by their weighting of evaluation factors 
(Taylor, 2007b).  In the evaluation of bids from potential aircraft producers, the Czechs 
rds the technical 
determining factor 
itional evaluation 
process where price and performance were the primary evaluation criteria in proposal 
curement of fighter aircraft in 2003 further illustrates the importance 
of ctors in the 
selection process, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Steinhoff stated, 
s of 
007:8).  Similarly, 
hairman Zemke, 
were the key factor influencing the government’s choice” (Seguin, 2007:30).   
 process and noted 
as the deciding 
reat deal of importance 
on the value and quality of the offset proposals offered as opposed to basing their 
decision on the price and performance of the competing aircraft. 
 
applied a 50% weight to the bidder’s offset proposals, 30% towa
requirements, and 20% towards price.  Clearly then, offsets were the 
in the evaluation process.  This represents a departure from the trad
evaluation (Taylor, 2007b). 
Poland’s pro
 offsets in the selection process.  In commenting on the evaluation fa
“one of the most important elements that would affect the final choice would be term
offsetting the purchase with orders placed in Polish plants” (Seguin, 2
Poland’s Deputy Defense Minister and Tender Commission C
commented on the choice of Lockheed Martin by stating that the “offset deals proposed 
Furthermore, the media in Poland also commented on the evaluation
that the unprecedented offset agreement offered by Lockheed Martin w
factor in contract award.  Thus, the Polish government placed a g
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Aerospace Sector Focus of Offset Activity 
The aerospace sector has been, and will continue to be, the focus of activity for 
rnments predominately focused their demand for offsets 
in port stated 90 
government focus on the aerospace sector will likely continue in the future to achieve 
he aerospace sector in 
y as an excellent 
apid technological 
advancement for the greater national industrial base (Wessner, 2004).  In addition to the 
 the largest portion 
their sovereignty, 
t a portion 
of their aerospace defense needs indigenously. 
Of
offsets.  In the past, foreign gove
the aerospace sector.  A July 2003 U.S. Commerce Department re
percent of offset agreements are in the aerospace sector.  Furthermore, foreign 
three perceived benefits.  Primarily, foreign governments focus on t
the belief that an indigenous aerospace industry is vital to their econom
source of high paying jobs, for its export potential, and as a driver of r
benefits to the economy, foreign governments see the aerospace industry as one that is 
vital to national security since aircraft expenditures typically represent
of a country’s defense budget (Flamm, 2007).  Therefore, to retain 
foreign governments consider it vital to obtain the capability to produce at leas
 
fsets Paid for by Purchasing Country 
Conceptually, an offset is a cost-free compensatory benef
economically inefficient since either the buyer or seller must pay for the ad
that are incurred (Bulgin, 2007).  Experts in the field differ on the cost 
it provided to the 
purchasing country in return for agreeing to purchase arms.  However, offsets are 
ditional costs 
of offsets in 
relation to the price of the arms-sales contract.  However, they agree offsets are costly 
and are paid for by the purchasing country.   A U.S. interagency team found offsets result 
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in a price increase of between 15-30% of U.S. exported equipment (Hawkins, 2007a).  As 
cited by Ianakiev (2007), Martin and Hartley stated that offsets result in an average price 
Bulgin (2007) 
 Finally, Markusen 
ministrative costs of 
managing offsets alone, indicating an overall increase significantly above ten percent (as 
ts in relation to the 
 result in 
untry. 
Numerous factors influence the cost and resultant price increase experienced 
ossible factors to 
inefficiencies, and 
ally, the 
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) (Background, 2007) identified the price 
hnology as a factor 
Jones (2007) found that offsets often introduce 
dis
Supplier search and switching costs is the first factor Ianakiev (2007) identified.  
 a potential supplier’s 
characteristics such as product price, quality, production location, and capacity.  Arms 
sellers incur switching costs when switching from an incumbent supplier to a new 
premium of 14.4% over comparable articles purchased free of offsets.  
reported increases in contract price of between three and five percent. 
(2006) reported a seven to ten percent increase resulting from the ad
cited in Brauer and Dunne, 2007a).  Therefore, while the costs of offse
price of the arms-sales contract is hard to pin down, it is clear that they
significant increases in contract price paid by the purchasing co
when offsets are included in an arms sale.  Ianakiev (2007) researched the effect of offset 
policies on the international division of labor and identified three p
explain the cost increase: supplier search and switching costs, supplier 
administrative costs incurred by the arms seller in managing offsets.  Addition
premium charged by offset providers as a condition of transferring tec
that increases the contract price.  Lastly, 
economies of scale which result in cost increases. 
Arms sellers incur search costs when searching for alternative sources of supply.  The 
sellers incur the costs in the process of gaining information about
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supplier.  The costs are those that are incurred when switching to a new source of supply 
that would not have been incurred had the seller remained with the original supplier.     
ified.  Offsets may 
ucer to change their 
sources of supply from
Often, these new supply sources are less efficient, and therefore more costly than the 
t production cost of 
 the increased costs 
Administrative cost is the third of Ianakiev’s (2007) factors.  Sellers incur 
m the inclusion of 
following contract 
reported a seven to ten percent increase resulting from the administrative costs of 
ma
 major factor that leads 
lued asset in the 
defense industry; it provides companies an edge over its competitors.  Therefore, a 
t monetary 
dds a price premium to 
the contract by the amount represented by the present discounted value of the net income 
from future sales resulting from its intellectual property.  The value represents, and 
Supplier inefficiency is the second factor Ianakiev (2007) ident
introduce market rigidities when the arms buyer forces the arms prod
 established sources to sources located in the buyer’s country.  
original ones (Jones, 2007).  The difference between the componen
the new source of supply and the original source of supply represents
experienced by supplier inefficiencies. 
additional administrative costs during the contract negotiation process due to the 
increased complexity of the contract negotiation process resulting fro
offsets in the proposal.  Additionally, sellers incur administrative costs 
award in managing burdensome offset programs.  As stated above, Markusen (2006) 
naging offsets alone. 
The NDIA (2004) also identified intellectual property as a
to price increases in arms sale.  Intellectual property is a highly va
company will not readily sacrifice this edge without receiving significan
compensation.  Thus, according to the NDIA, the offset provider a
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should be close to, the price that the buyer of the intellectual property would have to pay 
for receiving the technology in the absence of an offset agreement.   
ith offset 
 illustrates the diseconomies of 
scale through co-production.  Co in the seller firm locating 
a duplicate facility in the buyer country with the intent of utilizing that facility 
e agreement.  Thus, 
as well as the new 
 resulting from splitting 
the production orders between duplicate plants results in higher unit costs for the 
ed to the original 
 are not cost free.  
s procured 
under the contract.  Therefore, Waller (2003) concluded that offsets are paid for, 
ectly, by the procuring nation in the form of a price premium on the original 
co
aid for defense items 
resulting from the inclusion of offsets, yet seem to turn a “blind eye” to this reality 
ess to ignore this 
eceived as the result 
of the inclusion of offsets far outweigh the increased price.  Similarly, Hawkins (2007a) 
found that purchasing countries rationalize that the seller invests this price differential 
Finally, Jones (2007) found diseconomies of scale associated w
agreements as a source of cost increase.  Jones (2007)
-production frequently results 
specifically for production associated with the current purchas
potential production orders spilt between the established facility 
facility.  Thus, Jones (2007) concludes, the diseconomies of scale
components produced in both facilities. 
Given there are real costs incurred when offsets are attach
contract, and these costs must be recovered by the arms seller, offsets
In fact, they result in a substantial increase in the price of the original item
indir
ntract. 
Purchasing countries are cognizant of the increased price p
(Bulgin, 2007:9).  Bulgin reasons that the purchasing country’s willingn
reality stems from their belief that the short and long-term benefits r
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within the domestic economy through offsets that improve industry capability, 
employment, etc.  Waller (2003), along the same line, considers offsets as an indirect 
nomy; the purchasing 
 of offsets and in 
 
The Global Arms Market Structure 
obal arms market structure and its characteristics is 
ne irst, the defense industry 
transitioned from one of domestic focus to one that is global in nature over the last 25 
t consolidation to 
ar.  Third, arms-
sess large defense 
aller, 
advanced industries (second tier), and those that possess a very limited and 
 the United States 
&D) and 
try represents the most 
significant competition for the United States although other countries throughout the 
world are attempting to capture U.S. market share.  Finally, political and economic 
factors play a vital role in the current structure of the global arms market. 
subsidization of select sectors of the purchasing country’s eco
country directs and receives investments in its economy in the form
return pays a higher price for defense items. 
A discussion of the gl
cessary to understand the context in which offsets operate.  F
years.  Second, the global defense industry went through significan
adjust to the global arms market following the end of the Cold W
producing countries in the global arms market consist of those that pos
industries with highly advanced technology (first-tier), those that possess sm
technologically insufficient defense industry (third tier).  Fifth,
dominates the arms trade market through research and development (R
economies of scale advantages.  Sixth, the European defense indus
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Increasing Globalization of Defense Industry 
Perhaps the most significant development in the defense industry over the last 20 
e increasingly global in nature.  The transition from a 
do
lobalization was 
imperative to its survival (Lorell, 2002).  In fact, by the time the industry embraced it, 
for an industry to 
it to a global focus in 
However, the defense industry was not the only entity promoting increased 
ithin the 
need to expand the 
Additionally, officials saw the improved capabilities of foreign firms to provide high-tech 
ability solutions as rationale for promoting defense industry globalization (Lorell, 
20
 sources of supply and 
the increased importance of foreign markets for sales.  With increased globalization, 
lop subcontracting 
and other business relationships with overseas firms (Johnson, 1999).  Globalization thus 
produced an environment in which offsets thrived; the defense industry, increasingly 
years is how the industry has becom
mestic to a global orientation was driven in part by a consensus among leaders in the 
U.S. defense industry, the defense aerospace industry in particular, that g
globalization was already the dominant international system.  Thus, 
thrive in the changing environment, it increasingly needed to comm
its operations. 
globalization; the push also came from the U.S. government, especially w
Department of Defense.  Officials within the department perceived the 
U.S. defense industrial base from domestic to global in nature due to the increasingly 
reduced domestic competition caused by the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry.  
cap
02). 
Two key components of globalization are the integration of
defense companies around the world increasingly depend on arms sales in the export 
market for a large portion of sales; therefore, they increasingly deve
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dependent on foreign markets for sales and sources of supply, experienced increased 
exposure to offset demands from arms-purchasing countries. 
 
Defense Industry Consolidation 
Another important development has been the rapid consolidation of the defense 
industry in the United States and Europe.  The U.S. defense aerospace industry went 
he Cold War.  In 1990, 
ft.  By 1998, only 
se aerospace 
industry consolidated and there are currently only three major defense aerospace 
pany (EADS); 
tion was to create 
us enhancing their 
Additionally, in today’s environment of reduced defense expenditures, 
European defense 
order mergers with the 
y has been largely 
effective; ultimately, their goal is to become more financially and technologically 
Thus, defense 
industry consolidation created an environment of increased competition wherein 
European firms compete intensely with U.S. firms for limited export opportunities.  In 
through a significant period of consolidation following the end of t
eight prime contractors in the United States produced fixed-wing aircra
Boeing and Lockheed Martin remained.  Similarly, the European defen
companies:  BAE Systems; European Aeronautic, Defense, and Space Com
and Thales (Sköns, 2002).  The impetus for the European consolida
corporations comparable in size and capabilities to U.S. companies, th
competitiveness (Hartley, 2007). 
indigenous, autarkic defense industries cannot survive.  Therefore, the 
industry created pan-European defense companies through cross-b
intent of achieving economies of scale (GAO, 1997).  The strateg
competitive with U.S. firms in more product areas and promote European products for 
European countries and third-country procurements (Lorell, 2002).  
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this environment, offset packages offered by the competing firms takes on increased 
significance. 
iers of Arms-Producing Countries 
 
Three T  
The previous sections documented the globalization and consolidation of the 
defense industry over the last few years.  This section describes the categorization of 
), in researching small 
 industry into 
tries.  According to 
their definition, first-tier arms-producing countries dominate the global arms market with 
logy.  In Bitzinger 
nly of the United 
7) similarly limits 
into a single unit.  His reasoning in grouping the European countries together is that they 
me, though not all, 
an countries that Bitzinger 
tegorize as second-tier countries in the first-tier as members of a 
“conglomerate.” 
l, the level of 
sophistication of the second-tier countries is lower than the first-tier countries.  However, 
in niche areas, their level of sophistication can be on par with the first-tier countries.  
arms-producing countries into three tiers.  Bitzinger and Kim (2005
arms-producing countries, organized the global structure of the defense
three tiers according to the arms-producing capabilities of the coun
large defense industries that possess highly advanced defense techno
and Kim’s model, the first-tier is an exclusive category, consisting o
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.  Flamm (200
the number of first-tier states.  However, he includes Russia and groups European nations 
are “beginning to move toward a single European conglomerate in so
defense sectors” (1999:118).  Therefore, he includes Europe
and Kim ca
Second-tier arms-producing countries represent industrially advanced countries 
with smaller defense industries than the first-tier countries.  Overal
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Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Brazil, Iran, Israel, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, 
South Korea, and Taiwan are in the second-tier, among others.  Third-tier arms-
t defense industries.  
et but sometimes also 
are in the third-tier. 
United States Domination
producing countries have very limited and technologically insufficien
Therefore, they are unable to compete in the global arms mark
export low-grade arms to third-world countries.  Countries such as Pakistan and Egypt 
 
 
 States dominates the arms-trade market, especially in aerospace.  
Bitzinger and Kim (2005) and Flamm (2007) collectively include the United Kingdom, 
first-tier with the 
panies far exceed 
0 largest defense 
panies are 
located throughout European countries.  Expanding the list, 30 of the 60 largest defense 
opean countries 
nounced; 7 of the 
easured by aerospace related sales, are based in the United 
States (Presidential Commission, 2002). 
s 
than other countries 
and protectionist measures that give preference to U.S. sources of supply.  However, the 
source of dominance is not exclusive to domestic sales; global supplies for aerospace 
The United
Germany, Italy, France, Russia, and a European conglomerate in the 
United States.  In reality though, the capabilities of U.S. defense com
those of other first-tier countries.  Based on revenue, 17 of the 3
companies are located in the United States.  Meanwhile, 11 of those 30 com
companies are located in the United States, while 20 are located in Eur
(Guay, 2007).  The dominance in the aerospace sector is even more pro
top 10 aerospace companies, m
One might assume the dominance of U.S. firms in the defense industry stem
from the fact that the U.S. has a significantly larger defense budget 
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products are similarly dominated by the United States (Lorell, 2002).  The Rand 
Corporation reported in 2002 that U.S. arms producers supply more than half of the 
2). 
 investment and 
inance, Markusen (2000:14) stated 
that “American firms make most of the best weapons in the world, thanks to decades of 
ated, “It's obviously 
er of magnitude to 
dom” (as cited in 
Hawkins, 2007b).  In fact, the European countries Bitzinger and Kim placed in the first-
ent 
s (GAO, 2000). 
iven to domestic 
country can match.  In 2007, the defense budget of the United States was $439 billion, 
f the $439 billion, 
U.S. arms producers 
e of the size of the 
domestic market.  However, foreign arms producers do not have a domestic defense 
industry of sufficient size to be viable.  Therefore, they must rely on revenues generated 
from exports to sustain their industry (Flamm, 2007). 
 
global arms market, including the aerospace sector (Lorell, 200
Two factors primarily explain the market dominance:  R&D
economies of scale.  On the topic of U.S. market dom
public R&D investment.”  Similarly, BAE chairman Richard Olver st
clear that the extent of R&D in the United States is a very different ord
the R&D investment in the rest of the world, including the United King
tier along with the United States spent $7.1 billion on defense research and developm
in 1997 compared to $32.2 billion spent by the United State
The size of the U.S. defense budget and the preference g
production sources by the U.S. government create economies of scale that no other 
larger than the sum of the world’s next 20 biggest defense budgets; o
$147 billion was marked for weapons procurement (Guay, 2007).  
are able to maintain a viable, broad-based defense industry becaus
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U.S. Competitors 
In spite of the U.S. dominance of the global defense industry, it is not without 
ompetition.  European companies present the United States defense industry 
wi
ploying more 
people than France, Germany, and Italy combined (Hartley and Braddon, 2007).  
attempting to capture 
ma  China, Korea, Japan, 
 a world leader in 
aerospace products.  The Chinese government, for instance, identified aerospace as an 
or the 21st 
f becoming highly 
ission, 2002). 
 
Influence of Economic and Political Factors 
rivalry and c
th its most significant competition in the global arms market.  Within Europe, the 
United Kingdom is the leading competitor in the aerospace industry, em
Additionally, numerous countries outside of Europe are 
rket share from the U.S. defense industry.  Asian nations such as
and Singapore are aggressively pursuing an industrial policy to become
industry it intends to develop into a self-reliant, high-technology industry f
century.  In fact, Chinese aerospace companies have stated intentions o
competitive producers by 2012 (Presidential Comm
 
s market characterized 
connects prime 
nd subcontractors in 
second-tier countries.  Often precipitated by offsets, global trade increased as prime 
ers and 
 tier (Markusen, 
2006).   As the arms industry became more global, prime contractors located in the U.S. 
and European first-tier arms-producing countries maintained dominance in the field of 
Economic and political influences created a globalized arm
by an integrated arms-development and manufacturing structure that 
contractors in first-tier countries with foreign government buyers a
contractors in first-tier countries sold complete systems to foreign custom
increasingly awarded subcontracts to foreign suppliers in the second
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design and innovation.  While second-tier arms-producing countries possess 
technologically advanced industries, they did not have the resources or knowledge to 
second-tier participation in 
tries increasingly 
s 
producers sought to improve their efficiency by searching for the best suppliers, 
countries continued to 
ountries increasingly 
According to Hawkins (2007c), industrialization “introduced a qualitative 
e materials, skills 
d those which did 
ill, and facilities 
to manufacture the improved weapons.  Second-tier countries typically do not.  
stry through 
egration capabilities; therefore, they are the major 
se
Not only did economic factors drive the allocation of development and production 
their survival in the era 
of reduced domestic defense budgets (Lorell, 2002).  As foreign governments increased 
their offset demands, first-tier arms producers increasingly looked to companies in 
perform design and system integration activities.  However, 
arms manufacturing increased as prime contractors in first-tier coun
subcontracted operations they traditionally performed internally.  First-tier arm
regardless of location (Guay, 2007).  Therefore, while first-tier 
dominate the design and systems integration activities, second-tier c
provided components for integration. 
difference between states, similar to that between weapons: henceforward, the 
international order was divided between those state which possessed th
and facilities to manufacture the improved weapons and techniques, an
not.”  Today, first-tier arms-producing countries possess the materials, sk
Essentially, U.S. and European companies dominate the defense indu
superior design, development, and int
llers of complete systems in the world market. 
activities abroad, political factors such as the demand for offsets also played a role.  First-
tier companies increasingly saw foreign market access as vital to 
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second-tier countries to fill subcontracting orders in hopes of gaining market access 
(Markusen, 2006).  Prime contractors increasingly conducted make-buy decisions to 
The prime contractors, 
and other complex 
e contractors 
purchasing a higher proportion of the value of the final product from suppliers in second-
rime contractors in 
se, while 
r countries (Markusen, 
2000). 
 Market 
s market and its 
rate.  This section 
further discusses offsets in the global arms market. 
Ob
create offset opportunities and in the process gain market access.  
therefore, increasingly became specialized in integration activities 
operations that typically had high entry barriers.  This resulted in prim
tier countries.  Design, integration, and innovation remained with the p
first-tier countries that possessed the resources, technology, and experti
subcontracting opportunities increasingly were let to second-tie
Offsets in the Global Arms
The preceding discussion of the structure of the global arm
characteristics provide the contextual environment in which offsets ope
 
jectives in Demanding Offsets 
A review of the literature revealed three primary objectives
influence the balance of trade, win popular support of the public fo
 regarding offsets: 
r the purchase of 
expensive weapon systems, and industrial development.  While balance of trade and 
public support objectives warrant discussion, industrial development is clearly of greatest 
importance to most countries demanding offsets. 
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The rising cost of defense equipment, combined with limited post-Cold War 
defense budgets, created an increased awareness of the negative effect of arms purchases 
on fsets as a method of 
 and technology 
ent, and 
technology remain with the arms-selling country.  Additionally, both developed and 
s from draining 
f the economy such as 
e of trade measures 
were also an effective means of winning public support needed to spend funds on foreign 
industry received 
return. 
anding offsets is 
to increase or maintain the level of economic development of the domestic industry.  
 budgets on 
mestic industry (Brauer 
evelopment 
strategy wherein the government procures foreign arms and in return receives offsets that 
oncerns about 
domestic employment levels, and the importance of industrial competitiveness in a global 
economy have led governments to leverage their imports of major weapon systems so as 
 the balance of trade (GAO 1984).  Purchasing countries saw of
balancing trade in their favor by having some of the work, investment,
transferred to the domestic industry rather than having all the jobs, investm
developing economies demanded offsets to prevent arms purchase
government budgets when funds were needed for other sectors o
transportation, education, and health care (Bulgin, 2007). The balanc
defense equipment; the public was willing to accept the government purchase of weapon 
systems from non-domestic sources if they perceived the domestic 
compensation in 
Research indicates the primary objective of governments in dem
Conceptually, offsets enable an arms-purchasing country to spend their
foreign-produced arms while at the same time developing their do
and Dunne, 2007a).  Thus, governments view offsets as an economic d
increase the type and level of capabilities of the domestic economy (Taylor, 2007a).  The 
GAO highlights the focus on economic development by noting that “c
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to yield benefits for their domestic economies” (GAO, 1998:35).  Thus, offsets provide a 
method of leveraging arms imports. 
al studies seeking 
 of industrialized countries in demanding offsets and 
concluded that “industrial c ic reasons: to 
support their domestic defense industrial base, to reduce their dependence on foreign 
igh technology 
he methodology 
ncy team investigating 
offsets came to similar conclusions.  It found that purchasing countries demand offsets 
mmerce, 2007a).  
enced by the fact 
governments concerned with economic development as opposed to defense ministries 
(M
on the defense 
d that whether foreign 
governments direct offsets toward the defense industry depends partly on the level of 
to the defense industry and the aerospace industry, countries with developing defense and 
commercial industries tend to direct offsets to both the defense and non-defense 
In addition to the GAO’s findings, Sköns (2002:6) found sever
to determine the motivation
ountries seek offsets for three major econom
suppliers of military equipment, and to support their non-military h
industries.”  Economic development of the domestic industry is t
employed to achieve these goals.  A U.S. governmental interage
primarily to foster economic benefits for their country that, in turn, enhance national 
security and promote economic development (U.S. Department of Co
Finally, the priority of economic development in offset policy is evid
that, in some governments, offset deals are negotiated by ministries in the foreign 
arkusen, 2006).   
Governments can focus their economic development objectives 
sector, the non-defense sector, or both.  The GAO (1996) determine
development of the defense industry at the time of the offset agreement.  The report 
concluded that countries possessing developed defense industries typically direct offsets 
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industries, and countries with less industrialized economies direct offsets to commercial 
industries.  Examples of countries with well-developed defense industries that direct 
ain, and the United 
th their defense 
ent of both 
their defense and non-defense industries.  Finally, the GAO (1996) identified Kuwait, 
offsets to non-
opment of the country’s 
Verzariu (2000) chronicled the evolution of offset practices from the 1970s 
ing 
 (2007) found non-
United Kingdom.  
e.  Both authors 
highlighted select agreements that were non-defense in nature that showed how defense 
 development, 
ing to purchase 160 F-16s.  
Bulgin (2007) points to non-defense industrial investments in hospitals and the 
automotive and railway industries in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
 
offsets to their defense industries include Canada, the Netherlands, Sp
Kingdom.  South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan direct offsets to bo
industries and non-defense industries; their goal is to further the developm
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as countries that direct 
defense industries; their goal is to direct offset towards the devel
infrastructure and businesses. 
through the 1990s and concluded that non-defense related offsets were becom
increasingly dominant in offset agreements (2000).  Similarly, Bulgin
defense offsets accounted for the majority of offsets provided by the 
More so, non-defense offsets were growing in importance and volum
industries became intertwined with industries outside of their competency.  For instance, 
Verzariu (2000) showed how General Dynamics invested in hotels, port
and a thermal power plant in Turkey in return for Turkey agree
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Economic Development Strategy 
Foreign governments typically promote key sectors of the domestic industry 
evelopment strategies; offsets are a tool these governments often 
us ctors (Jones, 2007). In 
where the buying government’s motives are to promote select areas of the economy; in 
at the buying 
 argument, the GAO 
nt is able to direct the 
seller to make investments in specific areas of the domestic economy that might not have 
stic capability, in 
 the resulting need 
porting 
government must import arms because its industry does not possess the technologies 
ne
trial development 
rgeted sectors.  
According to Taylor (2007a), offsets enhance industrial development by promoting the 
y Hartley and 
Braddon (2007) validated this sentiment and found that the exposure of a company to 
highly productive leaders in a manufacturing industry results in increased productivity of 
through their economic d
e to focus industrial development on targeted, special interest se
this respect, Waller (2003:225) argues that offsets represent a form of indirect subsidy 
most cases, he states that offsets “are a form of commercial policy th
government use to address domestic problems.”  Along the same
(1984) argues that, by demanding offsets, the purchasing governme
been made in the absence of offsets.  Governments typically place a great deal of 
emphasis on technology acquisition, one method of improving dome
their economic development strategy.  A lack of existing capability and
to rely on imports is the motivational factor behind the strategy; often, the im
eded to produce the arms locally (Taylor, 2007a). 
A key factor in the success of a purchasing country’s indus
program is to promote the increase in skills and productivity of the ta
cooperation of an established supplier with domestic suppliers, which allows the 
domestic supplier to learn and develop new skills.  Previous research b
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the company.  Additionally, they found the higher the level of exposure to the industry 
leaders, the higher the relative productivity of the company.  Similarly, the GAO (1998) 
ortunity to leverage 
-tier arms-
Since foreign governments view the defense industry as a key sector of the 
do manding offsets is to 
ded in his research 
fsets do so with the 
intention of establishing or expanding their defense industrial base.  Sköns (2002) found 
ncluded that some 
d domestic arms 
Increasing the level of exports of the domestic economy is another aspect of the 
ing government 
 manufacturing and 
ervices for export 
(GAO, 1984).  Through an offset agreement, the purchasing government can demand the 
ents with domestic 
companies.  Therefore, the buying government ensures manufactured components are 
produced by the domestic industry for export (Waller, 2003). 
 
stated that offsets allow companies in the purchasing country the opp
the experience and expertise of large prime contractors located in first
producing countries, thus improving their skills and productivity. 
mestic industry, a primary goal of most buying countries in de
develop or maintain its defense industrial base.  Falco (1998) conclu
on offsets in the aerospace industry that most countries demanding of
that second-tier arms-producing countries demand offsets to develop the defense industry 
through technology infusion.  Finally, Brauer and Dunne (2007b) co
states demand offsets with the goal of reviving a collapsed or faile
industry and cited Poland as one such country. 
purchasing government’s economic development strategy.  The purchas
perceives offsets as an effective method to increase exports by placing
service jobs within the domestic industry that will produce goods and s
selling company establish co-production and subcontracting agreem
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Poland Offset Program 
Poland’s offset program provides an illustration of a country’s concern for its 
l capability, its offset policies, goals in demanding offsets, and their 
mo on the Polish defense 
ndustry as “one of 
the basic factors maintaining the independence of the state and necessary condition to 
 of Economic 
e importance of defense 
ational defense 
sector.”  Additionally, it indicates Poland seeks to attain a level of independence in its 
ential in fulfilling 
ts productive and 
.  Therefore, 
the handbook indicates Poland’s view of the importance of developing an independent 
uipment needs of its forces.  However, 
Po
ss in the defence 
 the entities of the Polish 
ropean and transatlantic cooperation in the field of the 
ent, thus 
inistry of 
Poland’s goal of integration with its allies is further validated by The Security Strategy of 
the Republic of Poland, adopted on 4 January 2000.  It describes how Poland intends to 
defense industria
tives for establishing a defense industrial base.  In its handbook 
industry, Poland confirms the importance of an independent defense i
implement the security strategy of the Republic of Poland” (Ministry
Affairs and Labor, 2007:6).  The handbook also states: “due to th
policy, every country pays special attention to the development of its n
weapons production potential by stating: “Polish Armed Forces must be equipped with 
modern armament and military equipment. Among many factors ess
those tasks, very important are the defense industry potential and i
innovative capabilities” (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labor, 2007:4)
defense industrial base capable of supplying the eq
land also seeks to integrate its defense industry with its allies. 
One of the most essential assumptions of the restructuring proce
industry sector…is the creation of possibilities to include
defence industry into the Eu
development and production of armament and military equipm
developing the common market of defence industry products. (M
Economic Affairs and Labor, 2007:4) 
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restructure and modernize its defense industry to achieve “full integration” with its 
European and U.S. allies (Wolosz, 2004:4). 
lity to indigenously 
d forces, it also seeks to integrate its industry with its 
allies in Europe and the United States.  
industrial integration is to enhance the export potential of its defense industry.  The 
d Polish defense 
ense Industry are being 
rmined in the 
technical modernization program of the Polish Armed Forces…taking into account the … 
o achieve export 
e industry will be 
arket of defense 
products and participate in international cooperation in this field” (Ministry of Economic 
 arms export 
ma ts with this goal in mind. 
ial modernization 
program, the handbook rationalizes the need for offsets and the expectations and 
 industry is not 
on’s defence and 
security. This situation forces the government to import armaments, apart from 
purchasing them domestically” (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labor, 2007:10).  The 
Therefore, while Poland places great importance on its abi
produce arms required by its arme
One of the goals of international defense 
handbook highlights the potential export opportunities of a revive
industry by noting, “The potential and structure of the Polish Def
shaped according to the size and type of the defense requirements dete
possibilities arising from export contracts” (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labor, 
2007:6).  Furthermore, the handbook indicates Poland’s desire t
opportunities by noting that the restructuring process of the defens
tailored to “cope effectively with the competition in the international m
Affairs and Labor, 2007:4).  Thus, it is clear Poland intends to enter the
rket and is focusing its defense industrial modernization effor
In addition to describing the goals of the defense industr
objectives of Poland’s offset program.  It begins by noting: “the national
always able to meet all the requirements and needs concerning the nati
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handbook then explains that offsets obligate foreign suppliers to cooperate with national 
contractors as compensation for receiving the contract.  The handbook concludes by 
omic growth” 
economy and specifically to the growth of its defense sector.  Specifically, the handbook 
 offset agreements ensure the participation of 
foreign suppliers in the process of restructuring and developing the 
pment of Polish 
ustry; gaining 
reasing current 
ments in 
pment of Polish 
 the Republic of 
(Ministry of 
, 2007:11) 
 in the literature 
concerning offset objectives.  Namely, their offset objectives consist of general economic 
att on. 
f the expectations 
oland’s choice of the 
F-16 over European fighter options and noted that “Polish aircraft production capacity 
land’s air force reform 
and modernization program and described the state of Poland’s aerospace industry by 
noting, “The Polish aviation industry at the end of Communist rule was adept only at 
noting that offsets are “one of the instruments for contributing to econ
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labor, 2007:10). 
Thus, Poland expects offsets to contribute positively to the growth of the Polish 
lists the expectations and objectives of offsets. 
According to the Offset Law
economy of the Republic of Poland, in particular:  develo
industry, especially with regard to the Polish Defense Ind
access to new export markets for Polish industry or inc
export potential; transfer of new technologies and improve
organization; development of research work, develo
universities and R&D centers; creation of new jobs in
Poland, in particular in regions affected by unemployment.  
Economic Affairs and Labor
Therefore, Poland’s offset objectives closely mirror those cited
development, industrial development with the defense industry receiving special 
ention, increasing Polish exports, technology transfer, and job creati
Poland's procurement of 48 F-16 aircraft provides an example o
government officials have for offsets.  Seguin (2007:6) researched P
[was] in a dismal state.”  Similarly, Wolosz (2004:6) chronicled Po
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building variants of Soviet designs and selling its wares to a captive Warsaw Pact market.  
The plants probably cannot support the extensive, present-day modernization of the 
ce a modern 
hase F-16s from 
assistance of offset agreements.  Thus, Poland determined it must look externally in its 
strial base, and the 
pear to be one of 
owever, Poland will 
not know for years whether offsets were the appropriate method of achieving their 
 
 
ffsets
Polish air force at a reasonable cost.”  Therefore, the capability to produ
fighter in Poland did not exist at the time of the agreement to purc
Lockheed Martin.  In addition, its modernization could not be supported without the 
efforts to modernize the Polish Air Force.  Certainly, the Polish indu
defense industry in particular, requires assistance.  Offset demands ap
Poland’s major strategies for rebuilding its ailing defense industry.  H
objectives.
The Economics of O  
me increasingly 
liberal, the arms market has been largely sheltered from liberalized trade.  Governments 
st measures and 
acteristic of a liberalized 
luence than 
governments.  Foreign government policies on offsets, in particular, contribute to the 
ployed by foreign 
g business in a 
market not characterized by perfect competition.  Waller (2003) likens foreign 
government offset policies to indirect government subsidization of its domestic defense 
While international trade outside of the arms market has beco
exert a great deal of influence on the arms market through protectioni
industrial development policies.  Thus, free market forces char
trade regime in markets other than the defense market wield less inf
illiberal nature of the arms market.  Verzariu (2000) equates policies em
governments to a form of a non-tariff barrier to trade, or a cost of doin
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industry; through government intervention in the arms market, the government is able to 
indirectly subsidize the defense industry by forcing the arms seller to invest in the 
t arguments against the 
s on economic grounds.  A U.S. interagency team notes, “while there is not a 
consensus among scholars on the pros and cons of offsets, they are generally regarded as 
tment of 
creased level of 
ntractor relationships 
rather than competitiveness and best value.  Economists question the use of offsets as 
f 
2006:A-8) states, 
y including terms 
intervention, and create distortions in world economy and trade.”  Additionally, Wessner 
r” by using offsets 
ffsets are antithetical 
icardo.”  She 
claims offsets create a global arms market where a country can purchase a portion of the 
y, thereby 
n the basis of 
comparative advantage.  Therefore, seller firms place work in the buying country due to 
offset demands and not economic incentives.  The outcome can lead to perverse 
domestic industry. 
Economists, scholars, and offset practitioners alike presen
use of offset
trade-distorting and economically illiberal and inefficient” (U.S. Depar
Commerce, 2007a:1-1).  In addition, the team points out the de
competition and innovation resulting from forced prime-subco
policy when offsets place benefits that have no relation to the arms procured ahead o
market factors such as price and quality (Taylor, 2007c).  Struys (
“Offsets are antithetical to free trade, they alter the nature of sales b
unrelated to prices and performance, introduce market rigidities, cause growing state 
(2007:50) states that foreign governments “meddle in market behavio
as an industrial policy tool.  Finally, Markusen (2006: 21) claims o
to the “national specialization envisioned by Adam Smith and David R
economic activity resulting from the arms purchase for its domestic econom
circumventing the national specialization that naturally occurs o
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economic market distortions.  For example, a seller company might finance infrastructure 
in a country that has little chance of being utilized beyond the typical short production 
orce prime 
t ones located in the 
To understand why foreign governments utilize offsets, it is important to 
un lobal arms market and 
ing sections describe 
ment but also 
the result of, and in response to, other determinates that create an illiberal arms trade 
s trade and 
earch and switch 
rms market. 
 
National Security Priorities and Free-Trade
run that comes from a single procurement contract.  Thus, offsets may f
contractors to replace efficient incumbent suppliers with less efficien
buying country (Struys, 1999). 
derstand other factors that lead to the illiberal nature of the g
how they influence the use of offsets in the arms market.  The follow
how offsets are not only a contributing aspect of the illiberal trade environ
environment.  The other determinates are national security priorities, arm
domestic preference policies of other countries, constraints on s
activities, and imperfect information in the a
 
lt of the interplay 
d above, the 
countries embraced 
the principles of free trade and the unrestricted flow of foreign investment.  However, 
it 
the market would come at the 
expense of national security.  Broadly speaking, countries consider an indigenous 
industrial defense capability and capacity necessary to meet national defense 
The current structure of the global arms market is the resu
between national security and free trade considerations.  As mentione
international economy has become increasingly liberal as industrial 
Sköns (2002) states that, in the arms trade market, countries have been reluctant to perm
a free trade environment for fear the increased efficiency of 
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requirements as key to achieving and maintaining national security.  Therefore, countries 
frequently institute policies that reflect protectionist measures to prevent the erosion of 
a liberal trade 
etermination of the 
Based on free-market grounds, one might argue against policies that do not 
pr rations come into play 
 technological knowledge with 
olicy. It is also 
lobal free market to 
g things that are used 
ecurity, is vital to 
 arms market. 
he illiberal aspects 
of the arms market.  Economists hypothesize markets that do not operate in a free trade 
urce misallocation 
y” (Markusen, 2006:7).  
ctices and 
policies meant to control and manipulate markets prevent those markets from operating in 
te economically inefficient outcomes.  To 
economists, offsets are a form of government intervention and represent an “illegitimate 
distortion of normal trade practices” (Hawkins, 2007a). 
their domestic defense industrial capabilities, impeding the benefits of 
environment such as competition and comparative advantage in the d
division of labor. 
omote economic efficiency.  However, other important conside
in policy determination.  As a Brookings Institute paper points out, 
avoiding foreign dependencies and protecting
regard to things that are used to defend a nation is rational p
rational policy to leverage the substantial benefits of the g
obtain the best value and capability available when procurin
to defend a nation. (Robinson, 2007:iii) 
Therefore, an overview of each position, liberal trade and national s
understanding the current structure of the global
 Proponents of free trade present numerous arguments against t
environment are subject to economic inefficiencies in the form of reso
caused by “distortions in the location and composition of industr
Government intervention in the marketplace through managed trade pra
a free trade environment.  Therefore, economists argue government intervention policies 
such as protection of domestic markets crea
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Citing Wolf, McLean (2007) argues for a reduction in government obstacles to 
free trade, such as offsets, to promote the many benefits of liberal trade.  His argument is 
tha efficient allocation 
 The resultant 
country producing only those products they can produce more efficiently than another 
eral trade regime 
hnology (McLean, 
2007).  In summary, the free trade proponents argue that if a country’s economic 
 by opening up 
er, 2007).  
nce of free trade 
ms market.  At the 
simplest level, proponents believe national security is too vital to expose to the 
 further argue that 
t themselves to the foreign 
annot 
independently pursue foreign policy objectives counter to those of the exporting country 
without risking the loss of its source of ar ust place national 
ade. 
In fact, this is what is seen in the arms market; countries widely use protectionist 
measures in the form of offsets and buy domestic provisions.  While countries might 
t free trade creates an economically efficient outcome through an 
of resources based on economies of scale and comparative advantage. 
specialization in the production of goods by the participating countries results in each 
country.  In turn, countries engage in trade to acquire products from other countries in 
exchange for those products.  Other benefits that Wolf attributes to a lib
are competition and increased productivity through the exchange of tec
development and growth were its highest priority, it would achieve them
protected markets to free trade (Brau
Proponents of national security argue against the domina
principles in determining government policy concerning the global ar
vulnerabilities of the free trade environment (Hawkins, 2007a).  They
countries depending on foreign sources of armaments subjec
policy priorities of the arms exporting country.  In effect, the country c
ms.  Therefore, the country m
security ahead of the economic advantages achieved through free tr
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publicly proclaim their support and adherence to free trade principles, the reality is most 
countries pursue managed arms trade policies to control markets in support of domestic 
tigation of offsets, 
national security, 
International organizations and trade agreements support government intervention 
in rade.  In fact, the 
nt Procurement 
rement activity in 
world trade.  Specifically, Article XVI of the GPA states, “Entities shall not, in the 
However, Article 
 GPA states, 
t any Party from 
 it considers 
terests relating to the 
or to procurement 
ble for national security or for national defence purposes. 
hich is 
ocuring items on the 
global arms market.  Mimicking the language of the GPA, GATT prohibits offsets in 
les (GAO, 1996).  
Therefore, while the WTO prohibits the use of offsets in government procurement in 
world trade, the prohibition is waived for government procurement of national security 
production (Hawkins, 2007a).  As Jones (2007:115) stated in his inves
“defense trade is and has been anything but laissez-faire. Interests of 
balance of trade, and industrial bases constantly influence proposed transactions.” 
the global arms market by permitting governments to manage arms t
World Trade Organization (WTO, 2007: 23) published the Governme
Agreement (GPA) to explicitly prohibit offsets in government procu
qualification and selection of suppliers, products or services, or in the evaluation of 
tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or consider offsets.”.  
XXIII, Exceptions to the Agreement, of the
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to preven
taking any action or not disclosing any information which
necessary for the protection of its essential security in
procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, 
indispensa
(WTO, 1994:28) 
Additionally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), w
administered by the WTO, permits governments to use offsets in pr
government procurement except for the procurement of defense artic
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items, particularly all items sold on the global arms market.  Lastly, member states of the 
European Union abide by the European Commission (EC) Treaty.  Article 296 of the EC 
ecessary for 
e protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected 
 production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such 
mpetition in the 
ot intended for 
3) 
Th e that international 
n in the global market.  
et by permitting 
governments to manage arms trade through offsets and other market distorting 
al defense. 
 
uirements
Treaty states, 
 Any Member State may take such measures as it considers n
th
with the
measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of co
common market regarding the products which are n
specifically military purposes.” (European Union, 2007:17
e language of the GPA, GATT, and EC Treaty provide evidenc
organizations and trade agreements restrict government interventio
However, they support government intervention in the global arms mark
mechanisms in the interest of nation
Foreign Domestic Preference Req  
Most countries have foreign domestic preference requirements that distort free 
eference to 
ese practices are no 
wery, 2007). One 
such law is the Buy American Act, which was passed by Congress in 1933.  This act 
a 50 percent made-in-
America standard.  Further, the act requires a six percent competitive pricing advantage 
to domestic business bids over foreign bids (McLean, 2007).   Another act that gives 
trade in the arms market.  While the United States does not have an official offset policy 
or require offsets for its arms purchases, it does have laws that give pr
domestic products and services over those from foreign sources.  Th
less trade distorting than offset requirements of foreign nations (Mo
requires that all government purchased products and services meet 
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preferences to domestic sources is the Defense Production Act of 1950.  This act allows 
the Secretary of Defense to restrict purchases of what are deemed critical items from 
uickly mobilize in 
frequently contain 
language and Buy American requirements prohibiting purchase of specific products from 
. The United 
tect its defense 
n defense markets 
either; they give preference to its domestic industry in weapons procurement and impose 
ilarly, most 
licies and demand 
er, 2007). 
to a de facto offset policy; the U.S. government requires that foreign sources of weapon 
ing a substantial amount of 
Foreign 
 international sources 
without requiring the production of the arms in the United States (Johnson, 2007b).  
nited States may not refer to its domestic production requirements 
as offsets, they appear no different than a 100% direct offsets policy to its trading 
partners (Johnson, 2007a). 
foreign sources with the intent of preserving United States ability to q
times of war. 
Finally, the annual Department of Defense appropriations acts 
foreign firms with the intent of protecting domestic firms (GAO, 1996)
States is not alone in the use of domestic preference policies to pro
industry.  Most members of the European Union do not have ope
offsets when they agree to purchase weapons from external sources.  Sim
every country that imports defense items has domestic preference po
offsets of foreign sources (Mey
Many countries believe the domestic preference laws of the United States equate 
systems meet U.S. domestic production requirements by mov
production and assembly work to the United States (Mowery, 2007).  
governments contend the United States rarely purchases arms from
Therefore, while the U
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    A U.S. interagency team reported countries employ offsets out of necessity to 
mitigate the impact U.S. domestic preferences have on their defense industry (U.S. 
De ssociation 
 countries indicate 
market due to domestic source or participation requirements.”  Finally, Bulgin (2007), in 
inistry of Defense 
 by barriers to 
 closed markets. 
The consensus in the literature is that offsets will continue to dominate the arms-
articipation in 
ands will continue 
ents that limit the 
ilarly, the 
U.S. Industry Trade Advisory Committee, after determining there was a connection 
estic preference laws, 
ment as long as 
rence laws remain, especially in the United States (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2007a). 
, international 
f the restrictions 
placed on foreign procurement from allied countries.  For instance, the Secretary of 
Defense, under the authority of the Culver-Nunn Amendment, restricted the application 
partment of Commerce, 2007b). The National Defense Industrial A
(Background, 2007) reported similar findings, stating that foreign
offsets or domestic participation requirements are necessary to “level the international 
his investigation of offset practices, found that the United Kingdom M
has a policy of Industrial Participation to correct the imbalance caused
competition in foreign markets caused by protectionist measures or
trade environment as long as other nations erect barriers to international p
domestic defense markets.  Scholars on defense offsets note offset dem
as long as the United States maintains domestic preference requirem
ability of foreign countries from participating in the U.S. arms market.  Sim
between the demand for offsets by foreign countries and U.S. dom
stated that offsets will not be eliminated from the arms trade environ
domestic prefe
The U.S. government has taken action in the form of treaties
agreements, and “Determinations of National Interest” to ease many o
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of the Buy American Act from U.S. procurement of defense equipment from the 
following nations:  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of 
rlands, Norway, Portugal, 
 of Defense can 
interest.  Thus, although the Buy American Act is still law, subsequent amendments 
ystems and 
2). 
ent application, foreign perceptions 
that the U.S. defense market is closed to competition outside the United States should be 
arket 
n imports of U.S. 
e, offsets are still 
necessary to act as a counterweight to U.S. protectionist measures and to level the playing 
field in the arms market. 
Se
Germany, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nethe
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  Additionally, the Secretary
exclude other nations outside those mentioned above when deemed to be in the national 
exclude virtually every nation that sells high-technology weapon s
components from U.S. domestic preference laws (Lorell, 200
In light of these exemptions and their frequ
alleviated.  However, foreign countries continue to consider the U.S. defense m
closed (Lorell, 2002).  The findings in a Department of Defense White Paper validates 
this perception; it found the United States spent less than 2 percent o
defense articles during 2004  (Guay, 2007).  Therefore, they rationaliz
 
arch and Switching Costs 
market.  Arms sellers incur search costs when searching for alternative sources of supply; 
the costs are incurred in the process of gaining information about
Search and switching costs represent another barrier to the liberal arms trade 
 a potential supplier’s 
characteristics such as product price, quality, production location, and capacity.  Arms 
sellers incur switching costs when switching from an incumbent supplier to a new 
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supplier (Ianakiev, 2007).  Ianakiev’s (2007) investigation into how offset policies affect 
the international division of labor provides an in-depth analysis of search and switch 
he impediment.  
etween 
rge defence system integrators and potential partners or suppliers may not occur 
spontaneously. … Offset policies can be effectively used to modify the exporting 
 located in the 
Th  an environment characterized by imperfect 
on potential foreign 
sources of supply).  Obtaining information implies that the seller will incur search costs.  
fficiency increase 
t naturally favors 
suppliers. 
Offsets provide an incentive to entice sellers to search and switch by supporting 
earch for suppliers as a 
its through the 
 switch activities up 
to the point the costs are less than the profits from the contract.  In the absence of the 
remain with the incumbent supplier.  Therefore, by providing incentives for the seller to 
search and switch, offsets enable the purchasing country to overcome the natural barriers 
costs as an impediment to liberal trade and how offsets act to remove t
He states that, 
if informational deficiencies and switching costs are present, relations b
la
company’s incentives to seek out and establish links with firms
importing country. (Ianakiev, 2007:2) 
e global arms market operates in
information (i.e., arms sellers do not have perfect information 
However, Ianakeiv (n.d.) found that arms sellers are unlikely to search for alternative 
sources of supply when the search costs are higher than the potential e
or cost saving gained by changing suppliers.  Thus, the arms marke
incumbent suppliers over new 
the incurred costs through a contract price premium.  Refusing to s
condition of the offset agreement would result in the seller losing prof
contract.  Thus, (2007) found that the seller will perform search and
offset, the seller likely will not search for suppliers in the purchasing country and will 
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that result from the search and switching costs.  The result, theoretically, is a transfer of 
work from external sources to the domestic industry.  
rce a company to 
ted in a beneficial relationship for both parties 
and instances that did not bene
and Hartley to illustrate the positive effects of offsets on promoting search and switch by 
upply.  The survey 
bligation had led 
es the intention 
was to continue to do business with new source once the offset obligation had been 
7:5-6). 
ents had led their 
have found in the 
exists for offsets to create market-distorting effects when the incentives to search and 
s efficient ones located in 
ternational 
fulfilled, the seller 
may be have no other option but to remain with the new supplier; otherwise, the seller 
would incur additional search and switch costs in changing its source of supply (Ianakiev, 
2007). 
 
The literature provides instances where the use of offsets to fo
perform search and switch activities resul
fit the parties.  Ianakiev (2007) cites a  survey by Martin 
sellers and the resultant relationships established with new sources of s
states, “In six of the 11 offset sales the respondents said that the offset o
to the discovery of new, lower cost, sources of supply and in all six cas
fulfilled” (Ianakiev, 200
Similarly, a U.S. interagency team reported that offset requirem
companies to discover efficient subcontractors that they would not 
absence of offsets (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007a).  Conversely, the potential 
switch lead to the seller replacing incumbent suppliers with les
the buyer country.  Ultimately, this can lead to deterioration in the in
distribution of productive activities.  Once the offset obligations are 
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Imperfect Information 
Offsets are a government policy tool in response to the lack of perfect information 
nistic and oligopolistic nature of the global arms trade market.  Taylor 
(2 e use of offsets by 
rs and sellers have 
perfect information about product quality, cost, and value.  Moral hazard and adverse 
ave perfect 
change” are not present. 
tbook competitive 
market.  In fact, information is often asymmetric; either the buyer or seller possesses 
yers nor sellers in 
sony.  As Taylor 
cture approaches 
oligopoly” due to the prevalence of high technology products and tacit information in 
 the oligopolistic 
 the market create environments where buyers and sellers are 
vu
Taylor (2007c:2) further states, “When oligopolistic multinational firms are key 
 comparative 
advantage.”  In most markets, buyers use their leverage to achieve price discounts.  
However, in the arms market, governments instead use their oligopsony power to demand 
and the oligopso
007c) describes the economic environment of the arms market and th
buyer countries.  In the theoretical competitive market, numerous buye
selection is non-existent in a market where both buyers and sellers h
information.  Therefore, risks associated with “arm’s length ex
However, very few actual markets fit the definition of the tex
information not shared with the other, allowing for moral hazard and adverse selection to 
exist.  Concerning the arms trade market, there are neither numerous bu
the market; sellers are part of an oligopoly and buyers an oligop
(2007c:11) states, “exchange hazards tend to increase as the market stru
these markets.  Therefore, the existence of asymmetric information and
and oligopsonistic nature of
lnerable to opportunistic behavior. 
decisionmakers, it would be foolhardy for a developing country to proceed with policy on 
the basis of traditional models of pure competition, perfect markets, and
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offsets rather than price discounts that actually increase the price of the procured product.  
Taylor (2007b) states the use of offsets by an oligopsony power points to the market 
arket activity; he 
exchange 
similarly concluded that offsets enhance the efficiency of the market by decreasing the 
n (Taylor, 2007a). 
Technology Acquisition and Utilization 
The goal of most arms-buying countries in demanding offsets is to develop or 
 arms trade offset 
e indigenous arms 
ent strategy is the 
acquisition of technology from arms sellers through offset agreements (Brauer and 
. Department of Commerce (2007b:1-5) provides the following 
de
t agreement and 
technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of overseas 
cial arrangement 
There exists a wide technology gap between first and second-tier arms-producing 
countries necessitating the need of second-tier countries to pursue technology transfer. 
imperfections that exist in the arms market and the importance of non-m
concludes that offsets are a response to the existence of hazardous 
environments in the global arms trade market (Taylor, 2007b).  In another paper, he 
probability of seller opportunism resulting from imperfect informatio
 
maintain the domestic defense industrial base.  As Brauer and Dunne ( 2007b:12) state, 
“a number of countries have been clear that their primary purpose with
work regards not general economic development but development of th
industry.”  A crucial element of their defense industrial developm
Dunne, 2007b).  The U.S
finition of technology transfer. 
Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offse
that may take the form of research and development conducted abroad, 
investment, or other activities under direct commer
between the defense prime contractor and a foreign entity.  
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To demonstrate this concept, the Polish defense industry handbook, Vademecum, states 
the following. 
ence industry is 
its innovation capability which is mainly expressed in the use of modern 
chnologies…The key role in the acquisition of modern technologies is played 
ic Affairs and 
Ye ng countries due to 
irst-tier 
spends far more on defense research and development than any 
other country.  For example, in 1997, the United States spent $32.2 billion on defense 
combined; second-
-buying countries 
heir technological 
base (Waller, 2003).  Through its offset policies, these countries seek to attain the 
ce and market their 
ractors in first-tier 
ieve offsets will 
provide the technology infusion needed to enable their companies to produce advanced 
gy from weapon 
seller to weapon buyer believe offsets are effective at achieving significant technology 
transfer.  A GAO (1994:2) report investigating Asian aeronautical industrial development 
The basic decisive factor in the level of competitiveness of the def
te
by the research and development activities (Ministry of Econom
Labor, 2007:8) 
t, Poland cannot hope to compete with first-tier weapons-produci
the disparity between the investment in research and development of the f
countries compared to second-tier. 
The United States 
research and development while the remaining first-tier weapons-producing countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) spent $7.1 billion 
tier countries spent even less (GAO, 2000).  Thus, second-tier arms
import technology from weapons sellers in the first-tier to improve t
technology that will provide their firms with the capability to produ
products, either as a supplier or in direct competition to prime-cont
countries (GAO, 1996).   Through offset policies, these countries bel
weapon systems. 
Proponents of utilizing offsets to enable the transfer of technolo
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noted that technology transfer through offset agreements “allows Asian nations to 
develop industrial and technological capabilities in a fraction of the time needed to 
the offset agreements 
w their country to 
Kleiber, head of the offset committee in Poland notes: “Most of the proposals [in the F-16 
bridge would be 
fsets will therefore 
sfer. 
Critics of utilizing offsets to enable the transfer of technology from weapon seller 
ving the reported 
ture.  They found 
country’s economic development” (Brauer and Dunne, 2007a:1).  Additionally, they 
ficant technology 
07a:1).  While 
ndustry did not 
acquire sufficient capabilities to close the technology gap with technologically advanced 
 initial technology 
transfer.  The inability to keep up with the state of technology in the United States was 
especially pronounced.  Finally, Brauer and Dunne (2007a) observed that the limited 
cultivate them from scratch.”  Similarly, Polish officials believe 
attached to the purchase of F-16s from Lockheed Martin will allo
develop an indigenous defense industry through technology transfer.  As Michael 
offset agreement] involve state-of-the-art technology…a technological 
created between the United States and Poland” (Spreading, 2007).  Of
allow Poland to revitalize its defense industry through technology tran
to weapon buyer disagree with this positive assessment.  Brauer and Dunne (2007a) 
conducted research to investigate how effective offsets are at achie
benefits by examining empirical evidence contained in existing litera
“virtually no case where offset arrangements have yielded unambiguous net benefits for a 
found that offsets, with “very few exceptions do not result in signi
transfers, not even within the military sector” (Brauer and Dunne, 20
technology transfer did occur, they found that the indigenous defense i
weapons producers.  Even if they did attain sufficient capabilities to close the gap, they 
failed to keep up with the ever-advancing technology following the
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technology transfer that did occur took decades to achieve and came at a high cost.  
Therefore, Brauer and Dunne’s (2007a:1) findings indicate utilizing offsets in an attempt 
ons-producing 
 not 
time needed to cultivate them from scratch.” 
Defense Industrial Base Establishment and Maintenance 
icates a primary goal of most buying 
countries in demanding offsets is to develop or maintain the domestic defense industrial 
or arms, thereby 
pe to improve the 
although the levels of each vary depending on their ambitions.  Thus, the pursuit of these 
l of defense systems is 
tionally, some 
ns-producing countries 
while others have more modest goals such as becoming niche market producers. 
to close the technology gap between second-tier and first-tier weap
countries is not effective in transferring technology, is costly, and does
“allow…nations to develop industrial and technological capabilities in a fraction of the 
 
A review of the literature on offsets ind
base.  The objective for arms-buying countries in developing or maintaining their defense 
industrial base is to reduce the dependency on foreign sources f
increasing their level of self-sufficiency.  Secondly, these countries ho
export potential of their defense industry.  Typically, countries pursue both objectives, 
objectives is rarely mutually exclusive; improving export potentia
vital to achieving self-sufficiency through economies of scale.  Addi
second-tier countries have ambitions to become first-tier weapo
 
Increased Self-Sufficiency 
Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations, stated: “It is of importance that the kingdom 
depends as little as possible upon its neighbors for the manufactures necessary for its 
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defense” (Robinson, 2007:4).  To many, Smith’s basic principle for maintaining national 
sovereignty remains valid today.  “A fundamental element of the national security policy 
nance of their own 
d weapons 
s 
supply, countries are able to assert a greater level of political independence and 
any, events of the past validate the need for countries to attain a level of 
ind   Historically, 
governments have frequently attempted to influence the sovereignty of other nations by 
ilitary actions in 
ed until 1977.  By 
state; less than half of Turkey’s aircraft were operational due to their inability to acquire 
vereignty was compromised by 
ha
ces of production 
is one method countries use to reduce their dependency.  Existing research shows reduced 
(2002) argued that governments demand offsets for security related factors and desire 
independence in their defense and security policy.  By independently developing and 
of many nations (including most U.S. allies) is the creation and mainte
independent, autonomous capabilities to produce at least some advance
systems” (Flamm, 2007:116).  By reducing their exposure to foreign sources of arm
sovereignty. 
To m
ependence in arms production if they wish to attain sovereignty.
withholding arm shipments or issuing orders to domestic firms (Lorell, 2002).  One such 
event involved Turkey and the United States.  In response to Turkey’s m
Cyprus in 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo that last
the time the embargo was lifted, the Turkish armed forces were in a severely weakened 
spares and other military equipment.  Thus, Turkey’s so
ving to rely on foreign sources of supply for its arms (Ilbas, 2002).   
The use of offsets to improve the capabilities of indigenous sour
dependency on foreign sources for arms and increasing the level of self-sufficiency has 
been an important objective for many countries in their offset policy objectives.  Sköns 
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producing arms, Sköns (2002) concluded that the government becomes less dependent on 
the seller. 
improve the skills 
ir defense industries with the goal of reducing dependency on foreign sources of 
arm
(2007b:3) listed countries such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia that used offsets in the past 
 through “the 
f weapons systems in-
tablish their 
countries as regional powers through self-sufficiency.  Finally, Taylor (2007b) found 
demonstrated that 
ufficiency remain 
provision of offsets in return for agreeing to procure foreign military equipment with the 
, 1984).  Similarly, 
e Industries to 
se industries are 
self-sufficient regarding weapons production (Falco, 1998).  Brazil, in the past, has also 
 Brazil’s arms industry to 
fulfill a certain view of its place in the world” (Brauer and Dunne, 2007a:10).  Their 
vision of their place in the world was one in which Brazil would “take a leading, 
Johnson (2007b) determined many countries demand offsets to 
in the
s over time and attaining a level of self-sufficiency.  Similarly, Brauer and Dunne 
in an attempt to attain a level of self-sufficiency in the defense industry
development of an indigenous ability to produce a sweeping plate o
country.”  The motivation of these countries, they concluded, was to es
many countries view an independent defense industry as vital to their national security. 
 A survey of offset policies from numerous countries further 
reduced dependency on foreign sources for arms and increased self-s
important objectives for many countries.  For instance, Spain has a law requiring the 
goal of promoting self-sufficiency in their defense industry (GAO
Turkey’s “Offset Guidelines” directs their Undersecretary for Defens
manage the offset program with the goal of ensuring established defen
sought to attain independence in arms production.   Brazil’s offset policy “has been 
pursued not so much for direct economic benefit but to develop
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independent role on the world stage.”  With the goal of “fulfilling Brazil’s potential for 
greatness, and also in asserting sovereignty over her vast landmass and waters,” former 
red, “It is a 
s” (Perlo-Freeman, 
policies on attaining independent arms production capability.   In fact, South Korea has 
for offsets to 
systems for core force 
5 (Bitzinger, 
2003:49). 
 
port 
Air Force Minister Macedo, mirroring Adam Smith’s principle, decla
condition of security that each nation manufacture its own armament
2007:4).  Finally, South Korea provides another instance of a country focusing its offset 
some of the most ambitious goals.  Two of its primary objectives are 
enhance their ability to “independently develop primary weapon 
capability” and independently develop an advanced fighter jet by 201
Arms Ex  
ily by two factors: 
defense industry.  In reviewing current offset regulations of various countries, Verzariu 
unty’s balance of 
rsue sales opportunities 
hus improving the 
viability of the defense industry.  Therefore, countries tailor their offset policies to 
cializing in niche 
production in the defense industry use offsets to maintain their competitiveness in the 
global arms market.  They listed countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands that fit in 
Countries are motivated to enter the arms export market primar
a desire to improve balance of trade and to improve the economies of scale of their 
(2000) found the offset provisions frequently focus on enhancing the co
trade through exports.  Additionally, countries utilize offsets to pu
in the arms market and in the process create economies of scale, t
achieve these goals.   
Brauer and Dunne (2007a) found that second-tier countries spe
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this category.  Norway is another country that limits itself to the export of niche defense 
items.  Thus, it tailors its offset demands to enhance its defense industries 
operation, 2007).  
the arms export market by 
s niche 
areas (Brauer and Dunne, 2007a).  A U.S. interagency team summed up the goals of these 
is to ensure that 
veness through 
s indispensable 
subcontractors to larger European and U.S. prime contractors” (U.S. Department of 
ze in niche arms 
ucing countries.  
first-tier.  South Korea’s objective was to participate broadly in global arms trade, thus 
 industry 
 through the export 
Brauer and Dunne, 
2007b).  South Korea is pursuing this policy in spite of the fact its defense exports have 
, 2005).  India, a 
intends to not only produce niche products but to utilize offsets to develop its defense 
industry’s ability to design, develop, and export complete systems (Hawkins, 2007c). 
competitiveness in those markets (U.S. Embassy Office of Defense Co
Similarly, less developed economies have sought to enter 
structuring their offset programs to grow industries that specialize in certain arm
nations in stating, “The goal of these countries as demanders of offsets 
their high quality, niche technology defense firms maintain competiti
access to global markets…Their goal is to make their defense firm
Commerce, 2007a:4-4). 
Second-tier arms-producing countries typically speciali
production and provide a source of supply for first-tier arms-prod
However, there are countries that have attempted to transition from the second-tier to the 
matching their ambitious goals of building a robust indigenous defense
capability.  Therefore, South Korea sought to participate in the market
of a wide array of arms as opposed to specializing in a niche market (
traditionally been restricted to small niche markets (Bitzinger and Kim
country not known for its arms export potential in the past, has similar ambitions.  It 
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Efficacy 
According to Brzoska, countries have typically followed an arms industry 
lopment plan that entails ‘5 easy steps’ which consist of “assembly, component 
pro mponents, domestic 
cited in Perlo-Freeman, 2007:1).  However, research indicates an arms industry 
eed through all five stages.  
ntries that 
endent production rarely 
succeed.  Bitzinger (2003:39) describes the “dual dilemma” faced by second-tier arms 
ifth step: 
 for less-capable 
 not freed 
 to first-tier arms 
stainable self-
ctive, resulting in 
, as well as more expensive 
sets to achieve a 
e, they contend, fails to 
show offsets have succeeded in creating new or sustainable jobs in the economy in 
 goals.  Brauer and 
Dunne (2007b) also cite the realities of the marketplace in describing why these countries 
have been unsuccessful.  The market for arms, they contend, has witnessed a dramatic 
deve
duction, licensed production with imports of sophisticated co
design and production, and independent production with few imported components” (as 
development plan is neither easy nor should it necessarily proc
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests second-tier weapons-producing cou
attempt to establish an autarkic defense industry capable of indep
producers in their quest to achieve self-sufficient arms production capability 
characteristic of Brzoska’s f
[Second-tier arms producers] tend to pay higher costs
indigenous weaponry, while at the same time they have
themselves of their dependencies on and subordination
producers in critical technologies and components.  …su
reliance is neither technologically feasible nor cost-effe
indigenous weapons that are often inferior to
than, those readily found on the international arms market. 
Brauer and Dunne (2007a, 2007b) repeatedly assert the inability of off
sustainable defense industrial base in their research.  The evidenc
general and the defense industry in particular.  Further, they find the evidence indicates 
offsets do not advance the country’s long-term economic or military
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drop in demand due to the absence of conflict.  Thus, they argue “it seems absurd then 
that some countries still intend to build the [defense] industry and that offsets are thought 
mand in the market 
that due the 
worldwide, creates arms-producing countries that are too weak to survive.  Thus, there 
sion of costly state 
a, South Africa, and 
The literature also cites evidence of successful offsets programs.  As was shown 
.S. 
cer and integrator 
uccessful defense 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2004:51), “many European firms are technically 
of various critical 
cers have 
inc itical components. 
To many second-tier countries, offsets provided valuable assistance in enabling 
s studies and 
discussions indicate that U.S. prime contractors sometimes develop long-term supplier 
relationships with overseas subcontractors based on short-term offset requirements.”  For 
(and sought) to promote this” (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b:17).  As de
decreases, defense industries should exit, not enter. Finally, they argue 
exponential rise in unit weapon costs, coupled with the drop in defense budgets 
are “an increasing number of arms producers … kept alive by an infu
aid” (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b:19).  They cite Brazil, India, Indonesi
South Korea as examples. 
earlier in the literature review, the defense industry has globalized.  Thus, while the U
continues to dominate the international arms market as a first-tier produ
of complete systems, many second-tier countries have established s
industries based on a strategy that acknowledges their second-tier status.  As pointed out 
comparable and some superior to U.S. firms in the production 
components.”  Therefore, the U.S., and other first-tier weapons produ
reasingly come to rely on these second-tier countries to provide cr
their industry to integrate with the global industry (U.S. House of Representatives, 2004).  
As the U.S. Department of Commerce (2007b:3-1) points out, “previou
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example, Eland (2007:7) found that “U.S. prime contractors already purchase a growing 
proportion of critical parts and technologies for weapons from foreign subcontractors.”  
eased role of 
rime contractors; 
to 2004.  Further, it attributed the use of offsets as a main contributory factor.  Due to 
gly relied on second-
l domestic 
Data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2004) report supports these 
rs of the defense 
easured by dollar 
aircraft and engine parts.  Of that amount, $4.7 billion was attributed to direct offsets with 
ng from indirect offsets.  Thus, almost 11 percent of the imports resulted 
from offset agreements. 
Case Studies
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce (2004) observed an incr
second-tier arms producers in supplying critical components to U.S. p
the department found imports of components increased substantially in the ten years prior 
offsets, the department stated, U.S. prime contractors have increasin
tier arms-producers as sources of parts rather than relying on traditiona
sources. 
findings.  While they only provide data for the aerospace industry, it is reasonable to 
presume that offsets have also had the same effect on other secto
industry.  During 1993 to 2000, imports of parts and components, m
value, rose 82 percent.  During the eight-year period, the U.S. imported $71.5 billion in 
$2.9 billion comi
 
  
n (2007) 
conducted case studies on the experiences of Brazil in its attempt to establish and 
maintain a defense industrial base.  Noting that Brazil has pursued the development of its 
Numerous case studies have been conducted to analyze the efficacy of individual 
countries’ offset policies in achieving their stated goals.  Perlo-Freema
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defense industry through an extensive use of defense offsets since the 1970s, he states, 
“Brazil did not pursue arms trade offsets to achieve general economic development; 
er has been pursued 
place in the world” 
co-production, and technology transfer. 
il’s attempt to establish an independent defense industrial 
ba op 10 arms exporter 
chieved 
“spectacular success for a Third World producer and exporter in the 1980s.”  However, 
 to produce 
r selling point was 
 making a primary 
conditions on sales” (Perlo-Freeman, 2007:6). 
ately led to 
he Iran-Iraq in 1988 
ar served as a valuable 
source of demand for Brazilian arms; thus, the war’s end resulted in a substantial 
ically less sophisticated 
weapons much less attractive” (Perlo-Freeman, 2007:7).  Another indication of Brazil’s 
failure to establish their industry as a competitor with first-tier weapons-producing 
Brazil’s offset policy and practice … involving … technology transf
… to develop Brazil’s arms industry to fulfill a certain view of its 
(Perlo-Freeman, 2007:12).  Primarily, Brazil used offsets to achieve licensed production, 
During the 1980s, Braz
se appeared to be a success as the country consistently ranked as a t
(Perlo-Freeman, 2007).  As Perlo-Freeman (2007:1) points out, Brazil a
the source of their success can be traced to politics more than their ability
high-quality, technologically advanced weapon systems.  Brazil’s majo
the fact that they “followed a very loose export control policy, indeed
selling point to 3rd World buyers the fact that Brazil would impose no political 
Two events exposed the weakness of their export strategy and ultim
the collapse of their defense industry in the early 1990s:  the end of t
and the 1991 Gulf War (Perlo-Freeman, 2007).  The Iran-Iraq w
reduction in demand.  Additionally, the Gulf War “demonstrated the superiority of US 
technology, rendering Brazil’s ‘cheap and cheerful’ but technolog
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countries was the fact that Brazil still relied heavily on imports of advanced weapons and 
components to equip their military.  Thus, although it appeared Brazil’s use of offsets to 
 is it merely 
untries and did not 
s (Perlo-
Freeman, 2007). 
 current state of the Brazilian defense industry leads one to conclude that 
Br dustrial base has been 
s extensive 
indigenous arms production ventures started since the 1930s with various forms of 
-
 arms industry by 
lt to maintain as a 
arms supply in any case.”  Finally, Bitzinger (2003:41) notes in spite of being one of the 
 during the 1980s, “by the early 1990s… [Brazil’s] defence 
ind
ogram.  Prior to the 
mid-1980s, Turkey lacked a defense industrial base capable of producing sophisticated 
ary for Defense 
Industries to manage the offset program with the goal of ensuring established defense 
industries self-sufficiency in weapons production (Falco, 1998).  Ilbas (2002:70) provides 
establish a defense industrial base appeared to be successful, the reality
allowed its industry to supply substandard weapons to Third World co
free Brazil of reliance on the U.S. as a source of advanced weapon system
The
azil’s attempt to establish and maintain an indigenous defense in
a failure.  As Brauer and Dunne (2007b:14) point out, “of all of Brazil’
offsets, only a single one – Helibras – might be deemed commercially viable.”  Perlo
Freeman (2007:23) similarly commented on the failure of the Brazilian
noting “the arms industry in Brazil has proved costly, has been difficu
commercially viable concern, and cannot realistically hope to attain full independence of 
largest arms industries
ustry all but disappeared.” 
Another interesting case study involves the Turkish offsets pr
weapons.  Since then, Turkey has undertaken a program to develop its defense industry 
through offsets.  Turkey’s “Offset Guidelines” directs their Undersecret
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a positive assessment of Turkey’s efforts to establish an indigenous defense industry by 
stating:  “The production capabilities of the Turkish defense industry…indicate[s] that 
t of the country’s 
urkey continues to 
exports consisting of components produced by foreign contractors.  This indicates that 
iciency through 
f the inability of the 
ffset commitments by 
foreign contractors to keep their production lines running (Sariíbrahímoğlu, 2007). 
tempt to enter the 
al, appears to have 
RI (2008).  Under 
p an indigenous 
aerospace industry.  Under the program, U.S. manufacturers transferred technology and 
rogram ended, 
.  Therefore, a second 
y.  The program 
resulted in additional orders for Turkey’s industry (Ilbas, 2002).  However, with the 
ms since 1999 
(SIPRI, 2008).  Thus, although Ilbas (2002) provides a positive assessment of Turkey’s 
offset program in 2002, the available data since then, at least in the aerospace industry, 
the offset implementations significantly contribute to the developmen
defense industry.”  However, according to Sariíbrahímoğlu (2007), T
rely on foreign components for its main system exports with around 80 percent of its 
Turkey has not been successful at creating defense industry self-suff
offsets as the “Offset Guidelines” mandate.  A further indication o
industry to achieve self-sufficiency is that they continue to rely on o
Turning specifically to the defense aerospace, Turkey’s at
defense aerospace business, which centered on the F-16 production de
achieved limited success based on aircraft export data provided by SIP
the Peace Onyx program, Turkey embarked on a ten-year plan to develo
expertise to Turkey’s infant aerospace industry.  However, once the p
Turkey’s industry was left with industrial capacity but no demand
program, Peace Onyx II, was initiated between the U.S. and Turke
completion of the program, the industry once again faced production capacity with no 
demand.  In fact, Turkey has not exported significant aerospace syste
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indicate its effort to utilize offsets to establish and maintain an aerospace defense 
industrial base has not been successful. 
cusing its offset policies 
 production capability.  Beginning in the 1970s, South 
Korea pursued am
“independently develop primary weapon systems for core force capability” and providing 
fighter jet by 2015 
xport of a wide array of 
arms as opposed to specializing in a niche market (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b).  These are 
een restricted to 
ms (Bitzinger and 
05). 
lier to a first-tier 
supplier of complete weapon systems has not been successful in spite of the fact it was 
partment of 
im (2005:183) state: 
nfrastructure and 
technology … [South Korea] still possesses only limited capacities for self-reliant arms 
technologically practicable nor cost-effective.”  In spite of its failure, South Korea 
continues to pursue its strategy of defense industrialization and autarkic arms production. 
South Korea provides another case study of a country fo
on attaining independent arms
bitious goals that included utilizing offsets to enhance their ability to 
the jump start for their industry to independently develop an advanced 
(Bitzinger, 2003:49).   Additionally, South Korea sought to achieve the ability to 
participate broadly in the global arms-trade market through the e
ambitious goals since South Korea defense exports have traditionally b
small niche markets and have not involved export of complete syste
Kim, 20
South Korea’s attempt to transition from a second-tier niche supp
the fourth highest recipient of offsets during the 13-year period the De
Commerce (2007) has collected data on offsets.  As Bitzinger and K
“After more than 30 years of significant public and private inputs in i
production, and, in general, indigenous arms production has turned out to be neither 
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The case study of Sweden provides an illustration of a country that successfully 
employed offsets to achieve realistic goals for its defense industrial base.  For years, 
Sw g its defense 
duction.  However, 
ically and 
technically possible’ and that the country ‘can no longer afford to sustain a national 
itzinger, 2003:53).  
 industrial base with 
tion and the 
expanded promotion of arms exports” (Bitzinger, 2003:53).  Sweden has shown through 
ucers.  As such, it 
rvival nor be an 
arms producers to have consistently ranked among the world’s top ten arms exporters” 
(B
ms-producer in the 
se industrial 
strategy.  The experiences of other second-tier countries provide additional evidence of 
petencies and niche 
production; its defense industry is consequently thriving (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b).  
Taiwan recognized the need to adjust its defense industrial strategy as well.  As the 
eden has utilized offsets as a method of developing and maintainin
industrial base with the goal of achieving autarky in armaments pro
Swedish authorities have recently acknowledged autarky is “no longer ‘econom
defense industry to the extent that this was possible in the past’” (B
Thus, Sweden has set about to consolidate and rationalize its defense
the intent of concentrating on its “core competencies and niche produc
it defense industrial base policies that it understands the realities of globalization and the 
need to integrate its defense industrial base with first-tier weapons prod
has realized it can no longer rely on domestic orders for its su
independent arms producer.  As a result, Sweden has become “one of the few second-tier 
itzinger, 2003:53) 
Sweden’s ability to recognize its place as a second-tier ar
current global arms market enabled it to formulate a successful defen
the realities facing these countries.  Singapore, which similarly recognized the futility of 
autarkic arms production, shifted its strategy to focus on core com
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second leading recipient of offsets over the past 13 years, Taiwan recently acknowledged 
“the original plan for independent production of weapons must be stopped or reduced” 
ers (Bitzinger, 
tegrated, 
 trade offsets” (Brauer, 
2007:10).  Indonesia experienced the collapse of its defense aerospace industry despite 
ne, 2007b).  South 
develop and 
45).  Over the past few 
years, South Africa has abandoned this strategy in favor of one based on mastery of core 
us, autarkic arms 
industrial strategy 
attempting to achieve the ability to produce a broad array of weapon systems. 
 
Su
 the subject of 
offsets by documenting the importance of the topic and providing a knowledge baseline 
strial base in second-tier weapons-
producing countries can proceed.  The next chapter identifies the research methodology 
used in this research as well as limitations of the methodology. 
and has pursued a strategy to integrate its industry with foreign produc
2003:39).  Similarly, Spain recently “had to abandon dreams of an in
comprehensive, indigenous arms industry to be generated via arms
ambitious attempts to create an indigenous industry (Brauer and Dun
Africa once pursued a strategy of “possessing the capacity to design, 
manufacture a broad array of weapon systems” (Bitzinger, 2003:
competencies and specialization in niche programs (Bitzinger, 2003).   Thus, one can see 
that second-tier countries who recognized the futility of indigeno
production in the current globalized arms market shifted their defense 
to specialization in niche markets and concentrated on core competencies rather that 
mmary 
This chapter presented an overview of the current literature on
from which an analysis of offset objectives regarding technology transfer and the 
establishment and maintenance of a defense indu
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III. Methodology 
 
This chapter descr logy used for this thesis.  First, an overview of 
past methodologies utilized in offset research will be described along with their 
lim
Finally, limitations of the methodology will be discussed. 
Overview 
Initially, an exploratory study was conducted due to the complexity of the offsets 
issue and the need to significantly refine and scope the research problem.  According to 
 
 importance of the 
 able to formulate 
ploratory study 
enhances the researcher’s ability to determine the appropriate research methodology to 
ga lting from the study. 
luminous; 
xtensive research and 
have written at length concerning the topic.  Therefore, the exploratory study revealed 
ent publications, 
 on offsets is 
limited by the lack of public disclosure of data on offset agreements and transactions due 
to government sensitivity and the proprietary nature of offsets.  Thus, offset research in 
ibes the methodo
itations.  Next, justification for the methodology used in this thesis will be provided.  
 
Emory (1991), an exploratory study is useful in refining and scoping a research problem
into a manageable effort and allows the researcher to demonstrate the
topic.  At the conclusion of the exploratory research, the researcher is
specific research questions.  Additionally, Emory (1991) notes that an ex
ther and analyze data pertaining to the research questions resu
As discussed in Chapter I, the existing literature on offsets is vo
professionals from academia, government, and industry performed e
numerous research efforts on offsets to include books, theses, governm
and journal articles devoted exclusively to offsets.  However, research
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the past predominantly utilized qualitative methodologies that included case studies, 
personal interviews, questionnaires, and historical and documentary analysis.  Due to the 
ed on qualitative 
 context of foreign 
ractices, the use of 
questionnaires and interviews was not considered appropriate due to the lack of available 
uss internal 
Justification for Methodology 
ue the synthesis of 
own as a critical 
e exists a need to 
plications 
implicitly evident in the literature.  Weed (2008:2), in discussing the propensity of 
 literature through 
use is made of 
2008:2) commented: 
“There are never enough bricks and there are too few good synthesizers who wish to 
busy working on their own data!"  Finally, Solesbury (as cited in Weed, 2008:2) noted: 
"Most research effort is expended on new primary research and yet, on virtually any topic 
continued existence of these limitations, this research similarly reli
methodologies.  Considering this thesis sought to analyze offsets in the
government policy and practice and the efficacy of those policies and p
sources and a natural reluctance of foreign government officials to disc
government policies with outside interests. 
 
Utilizing qualitative methodologies, this thesis sought to purs
previous work on offsets as the primary research activity, also kn
qualitative review.  As is the case with many research topics, ther
synthesize the existing literature to bring to light the underlying trends and im
researchers to add to the already overwhelming volume of existing
primary research, noted that “there is a general concern that too little 
existing research.”  Along the same lines, Mills (as cited in Weed, 
search out the bricks and thus put the wall together. These worthy people are usually too 
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you can name, there is a vast body of past research that may have some continuing value 
but mostly remains ignored.” 
 narrative.  
se rigorous, structured methods, to search, select, evaluate, and 
synthesize the exis ally, Collins and 
Fauser (2008:103) note systematic reviews have “explicit and transparent criteria for 
tifying and 
ther, they state that 
arability of different 
studies” (Collins and Fauser, 2008:103).  Oftentimes, due to the availability or quality of 
ematic, 2008:3). 
 
 
While systematic reviews have their strengths, there are also weaknesses that can 
odology.  For instance, 
the systematic 
 for comprehensive 
coverage.”  The “narrative thread” they conclude, “could be lost in the strict rules of 
 a 
ade-off for broader 
coverage” (Collins and Fauser, 2008:3).  Jones (2008:96) agrees and argues against the 
presumption of the systematic review as the “gold standard” of qualitative research by 
Critical qualitative reviews can be categorized as systematic or
Systematic reviews “u
ting evidence” (Reviews, 2005:1019).  Addition
appraising the quality of existing research evidence, especially iden
controlling for different types of bias in existing studies.”  Fur
systematic reviews have “explicit ways of establishing the comp
existing literature, utilizing a systematic methodology can be inappropriate and thus 
represents “more an aspiration than an achievable goal” (Syst
Limitations
lead the researcher to pursue less systematic reviews in their meth
Collins and Fauser (2008:103) point out that a primary problem with 
review is the “narrow focus and prescribed methods … do not allow
systematic review” and thus, some topics are best served through the “wider scope of
traditional narrative review, in which less explicit methods are the tr
 
 
86 
stating “the time has come when it may be best to reacquaint ourselves with the adage 
that ‘the hallmark of good qualitative methodology is its flexibility rather than its 
e review has many 
ust acknowledge and seek to mitigate as much as possible.  
For one, while systematic reviews follow strict rules about searching the literature, while 
es not document 
dity of the included 
 non-critical and is 
not subject to the researcher’s sense of propriety; merely, the reader may not have 
ents about 
rature. 
systematic review 
rom impacting 
the quality of the research to the maximum extent possible.  Bushman and Wells 
bjective 
ve.”  Additionally, 
o not search all the 
relevant literature.  To mitigate these shortcomings, an exhaustive search of all relevant 
literature was perform
This thesis utilized historical and documentary research methodologies detailed 
by Lang (1984).  Historical research culminates in a written, integrated narrative based on 
standardisation’.” 
Collins and Fauser (2008) also point out that the narrativ
shortcomings the researcher m
narrative reviews do not follow strict rules.  Further, the methodogy do
“how the decisions were made about relevance of studies and the vali
studies” (Collins and Fauser, 2008:103).  This is not to say selection is
cognizance of the methods and thus is restrained in their ability to make judgm
the value of the lite
Research that pursues the traditional narrative review over a 
must seek to mitigate the potential shortcomings of the narrative review f
(2008:1123) note that narrative reviews are “more susceptible to the su
judgments, preferences, and biases of a particular reviewer’s perspecti
Davies (2007) notes that narrative reviews are selective in that they d
ed using electronic and print sources.  A search of the unpublished 
studies and works in progress was also performed. 
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critical analysis and synthesis of sources.  The first step in conducting historical research 
is to perform an extensive search of the existing literature for information related to the 
a and information 
nd evaluation of the 
Meanwhile, Lang (1984) notes that documentary research is similar to historical research; 
ulating theories 
in nature, 
n time.  Finally, the use of 
historical and documentary methodologies allows the researcher to build a solid 
tions. 
tary method.  The 
d truthfulness of 
the sources.  To mitigate the possibility of inaccurate or false information contaminating 
he accuracy of the 
 is called “historical 
ism.  External 
criticism consists of the researcher determining the source is authentic.  Internal criticism 
e source is 
ernal criticism on 
secondary sources by cross checking against the primary source.  Additionally, the 
researcher must perform internal criticism on primary sources.  Optimally, the researcher 
topic.  Once collected, the researcher evaluates and synthesizes the dat
to represent an accurate description of the topic.  In addition, search a
literature allows the researcher to provide further understanding of the research subject.  
it involves the steps of data collection, evaluation, and synthesis in form
and explanations.  However, where historical research is longitudinal 
documentary research is cross-sectional – focusing on a point i
foundation of knowledge upon which to analyze the topic and formulate conclusions and 
recommenda
Lang (1984) lists two limitations of the historical and documen
first limitation is the necessity for the researcher to verify the accuracy an
the thesis, Lang (1984) states the researcher must continually verify t
data contained in primary and secondary sources.  This verification
criticism” and consists of two components:  external and internal critic
requires the researcher to determine whether the data contained within th
accurate.  To the maximum extent, the researcher must perform this int
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should limit the review to well respected, properly documented data to mitigate the 
inclusion of inaccurate or false information in the thesis. 
ard against bias and 
tical perspective on the thesis topic.  To 
mitigate the possibility o e researcher should 
consult as many sources as practical.   Furthermore, the researcher must investigate the 
o verify bias and/or 
. 
 of the historical and 
documentary methodologies is the propensity of these methodologies to produce 
ereby quantitative 
, refined problem, 
o such processes.  
ethods can 
constrain the researcher to analyzing small aspects of the bigger picture, historical and 
problems that 
e of historical and 
e researcher to approach the issue at a higher level 
than is typically possible through other methods.  
The second limitation is the requirement to continually gu
prejudice, which requires a professional, cri
f bias and prejudice influencing the thesis, th
legitimacy and background of the author, the research sponsor, etc., t
prejudice did not influence the perspectives and findings of the source
According to Lange (1984), a primary weakness
generalized conclusions that are difficult to validate or refute.  Wh
methodologies are testable and repeatable, and tend to test a specific
historical and documentary methodologies do not lend themselves t
However, this weakness can also be a strength.  While quantitative research m
documentary methodologies allow the researcher to investigate broad 
typically do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis.  Thus, the us
documentary methodologies enable th
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
This research a erature to determine the efficacy of second-
tier country offset policy in enabling technology acquisition and utilization and in 
prom e.  Additionally, 
this research sought to document factors that determine the success or failure of offsets in 
ent and 
Technology Transfer 
try.  Many offset 
gy transfer.  Thus, 
tier to improve their technological base (Waller, 2003).  Through its offset policies, these 
th the capability to 
petition to prime-
es, these countries 
believe offsets will provide the technology infusion needed to enable their companies to 
produce advanced weapon systems. 
 
 
 
nalyzed the existing lit
oting the establishment and maintenance of a defense industrial bas
enabling technology acquisition and defense industrial base establishm
maintenance. 
 
A major goal of weapon buyers in utilizing offsets is to enable the transfer of 
technology from the weapon seller to the domestic defense indus
recipients believe offsets are effective at achieving significant technolo
second-tier arms-buying countries import technology from weapons sellers in the first-
countries seek to attain the technology that will provide their firms wi
produce and market their products, either as a supplier or in direct com
contractors in first-tier countries (GAO, 1996).   Through offset polici
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Efficacy of Offset Policies 
  To analyze whether offsets are effective at achieving significant technology 
dies summarized in Chapter II were reviewed to gather evidence of 
ea  a sufficient amount of 
documented the failure of the respective countries (South Korea, Taiwan, and India) to 
ocumented Japan’s 
 Korea’s goal in its offset policy was to achieve self-sufficiency in weapons 
production through technology transfer.  From 1993 to 2005, the period the Department 
s and foreign 
t agreements (U.S. 
on of technology, 
possesses limited capacities for self-reliant arms production due to its failure to overcome 
ase study by 
im (2005) on South Korea illustrates its failure to achieve its goal through 
tec
te inputs in 
nly limited 
eral, indigenous 
ically practicable 
idating technological 
and economic challenges, the ROK continues to pursue an ambitious, 
overly optimistic, and perhaps even naive strategy of defense 
industrialization and arms production. (Bitzinger and Kim, 2005:183)  
transfer, the case stu
ch country’s success.  Of those case studies, only four  contained
information to relevant to technology transfer efficacy.  Three of the case studies 
achieve significant technology transfer, while the fourth case study d
successful efforts. 
South
of Commerce collected data on offset agreements between U.S. firm
government recipients, South Korea received over $5.2 billion in offse
Department of Commerce, 2007b).  In spite of the substantial infusi
South Korea continues to lag far behind first-tier weapon-producing countries and 
the technology gap with the first-tier (Bitzinger and Kim, 2005).  The c
Bitzinger and K
hnology transfer:  
After more than 30 years of significant public and priva
infrastructure and technology…the ROK still possesses o
capacities for self-reliant arms production, and, in gen
arms production has turned out to be neither technolog
nor cost-effective. Yet, even in the face of such intim
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Similar to South Korea, Taiwan’s goal in its offset policy was to achieve self-
sufficiency in weapons production through technology transfer.  From 1993 to 2005, 
Ta States.  However, 
e first-tier to support 
tier to the inability to absorb transferred technologies due to insufficient human and 
 India’s offset program failed to 
ac logy transfer programs 
involving tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels, “resulted in spectacular failures.”  While 
ries and keep pace 
ran (2004) cites a 
ajor 
impediment to India’s attempt to improve the technological capability of its defense 
ind
fsets in technology 
d cost efficiently.  
Japan sought technology transfer in its offset agreement to build its industrial capacity.  
r Japan’s defense 
industry.”  Two key factors enabled Japan’s to achieve transfer technology through 
offsets, the preexistence of workforce that possessed high skill and education levels that 
iwan received $2.2 billion in offset agreements from the United 
Taiwan remains heavily dependent on imported technology from th
its defense industry (Chinworth, 2004).  Chinworth attributes the dependence on the first-
research and development resources in Taiwan’s infrastructure. 
Case studies by Baskaran (2004:218) show
hieve the results it sought through technology transfer.  Techno
certain technologies were transferred, the Indian defense industry “failed to acquire 
capabilities sufficient to close the technology gap with developed count
with technological change” Baskaran (2004:219).  Finally, Baska
reluctance on the part of the exporting company to release core technologies as a m
ustrial base. 
Of the country case studies that investigated the efficacy of of
transfer, only Japan succeeded in absorbing technology effectively an
Chinworth and Matthew (in Martin, 1996:177) state:  “Technology Transfer, particularly 
offsets, has been the driving force behind the development of post-wa
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could readily assimilate transferred technology, and the special relationship it had with 
the United States that assured an unrestricted flow of technology.  These factors were not 
to provide their 
reviewed indicate a country’s success in attaining the sought after technology transfer is 
failure of the 
significant technology 
fforts. 
 
present in the countries that failed to achieve technology transfer. 
Second-tier countries seek to attain technology through offsets 
firms with the capability to produce and market their products.  The case studies 
not assured.  Of the four case studies reviewed, three documented the 
respective countries (South Korea, Taiwan, and India) to achieve 
transfer, while the fourth case study documented Japan’s successful e
Factors Determining Success or Failure 
 factors implicitly 
nd-tier country in 
the ability of the purchasing country to:  acquire state-of-the-art technology, absorb and 
rred technology, and keep pace with technological advances following 
the technology transfer. 
Acquiring State-of-the-Art Technology 
re of a second-tier 
 country to 
acquire state-of-the-art technology.   As shown in Table 1, the literature indicated that 
technology transferred through offsets typically is not considered state-of-the-art.  Further 
One of the objectives of this research was to analyze the key
evident in the literature that determine the success or failure of a seco
achieving technology transfer.  Consequently, three key factors were identified regarding 
utilize the transfe
 
The first factor that appears to determine the success or failu
country in achieving technology transfer is the ability of the purchasing
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review of the literature revealed that two variables seem influence whether a second-tier 
country is able to acquire state-of-the-art technology:  the willingness of the exporting 
 exporting 
sequent two 
 
Table 1. Summary of Statements in Literature on Quality of Technology 
tement 
company to release its key technologies and the export controls of the
company’s government.  Each of these areas are addressed in the sub
paragraphs. 
Source Sta
(Brauer and Dunne, 2007a:13) 
chnology transfer into the 
urs, often over 
h cost 
Limited te
military sector occ
decades and at hig
(GAO, 1984:13) ogy transfers rarely involve hnology  
Technol
state-of-the-art tec
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 20 ed through offsets 07a:4-16) Technology transferris not leading edge 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 20
to transfer older, 
ologies to foreign 07a:C-3) 
Offsets tend 
established techn
firms 
(Brauer, 2007:12) 
lly use offsets to 
of technology that is on the 
tdated 
Companies typica
dispose 
verge of being ou
(U.S. House of Representatives, 20
ransferred to help 
veloping new 07:11) defray the cost of de
technology 
Old technology t
(Wessner, 2007:35) 
ts sold internationally are 
mature, sometimes to the point that 
 obsolete 
Most produc
they may almost be
 
has its future competitiveness in mind when making technology transf
Considering the selling company’s willingness to release technology, the seller 
er decisions; 
therefore, sellers are unlikely to put their competitiveness at stake when making those 
decisions.  Firms consider the shelf-life of a technology as an important consideration in 
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maintaining their competitive advantage when making technology transfer decisions.  
Table 2 provides statements in the literature on competition considerations in technology 
tatements in Literature on Competition in Technology 
Release Decisions by Exporting Firms 
release decisions. 
 
Table 2. Summary of S
Source Statement 
(Taylor, 2007b:14) 
nly aware of the potential loss of 
competitive advantage from technology sales 
Sellers…are kee
(Kramer and Sain, 2001
ed by an analysis of 
ic technology will hurt ) 
A company’s decision is temper
whether transferring a specif
its future competitiveness 
(Jones, 2007) 
logy that will not 
titiveness 
A company will only transfer techno
negatively affect their future compe
(Healey, 1999:222) 
be so shortsighted in 
ns that they would 
ate future 
petitors 
Companies are not likely to 
their technology transfer decisio
export technologies that will cre
com
(Taylor, 2007a:5). 
 have incentive to 
ey may be willing 
lary competencies 
Sellers earning supernormal profits
guard their technologies. While th
to disclose information about ancil
to win a contract, a firm usually guards its core 
competencies at all cost 
(Kramer and Sain, 2001
e.  If held too long, 
 too soon, it 
panies 
release technology they believe will become outdated 
within two to three years 
:111) 
Technology is perishable with tim
it becomes worthless.  If transferred
harms the firm’s competitiveness…Com
 
concerns motivate governments to impose restrictions on technolog
The exporting government’s export controls is the second variable in whether a 
second-tier country is able to acquire state-of-the-art technology.  National security 
y exports and thus 
impede a second-tier country’s efforts to acquire state-of-the-art technology.  Potential 
threats to national security in releasing technology include the ability of the released 
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technology to compromise technological leadership and threats to the defense industry’s 
capacity and capability to meet defense requirements (Lorell, 2002).  Thus, export 
 its technological 
ss through the same 
contained in offset programs are subject to the same controls as any other technology 
s Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended, provides the 
sta ce.  The act establishes 
U.S. policy for international programs to achieve specific national defense requirements 
fense articles and 
lso describes the 
plying 
with the regulation (GAO, 2000). 
Ab
second-tier country 
in acquiring and utilizing technology is the ability of the second-tier country to absorb 
 technology is 
ogy transferred with 
its defense industrial capabilities.  Research has indicated that core competencies, 
consisting of the tacit process knowledge, required to utilize the technology must be in 
controls are put in place that allow the exporting government to retain
advantage over potential adversaries.  Thus, offset transactions pa
export control mechanisms as the associated weapon.  Therefore, technology transfers 
transfer (NDIA, 2004). 
The Arm
tutory basis for the U.S. export control system currently in pla
and establishes the need for export regulations to reduce weapons trade.  Meanwhile, the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) determines the de
services requiring Department of State’s approval for export; it a
procedures for gaining export approval and outlines criminal penalties for not com
 
sorbing and Utilizing Technology 
 The second factor that determines the success or failure of a 
and utilize the transferred technology.  Success in absorbing and utilizing
highly dependent on a country’s ability to match the level of technol
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place prior to the transfer (Taylor, 2007a).  Thus, without the existing capacity and 
capabilities, a country is unlikely to develop a technologically sophisticated arms industry 
ents; a country’s 
uction.  
countries with less advanced industries due to the existence of a trained workforce and 
rtment of Commerce, 
 countries to 
cies:  
It is not actual arms production that creates the potential, but the potential 
oduction potential 
s a group, 
either to engage 
g manner. These 
ed to be grown 
ously. 
 
Keeping Pace with Tech
ond-tier country in 
ntry to keep pace 
iterature indicated 
that countries are not very successful in this area; whatever technology is transferred as 
advances of seller 
countries (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b).  Due to the perishable nature of technology, 
transferred technology becomes obsolete within two to three years of transfer (Kremer 
through an infusion of production orders attached to offset agreem
capacity prior to the technology transfer determines its actual arms prod
Therefore, a technically advanced country is better able to absorb technology than 
infrastructure capable of absorbing advanced technology (U.S. Depa
2007b).  Finally, Brauer (2007:11) alludes to the inability of developing
absorb and utilize technology due to the absence of core competen
that permits actual arms production. A country’s arms pr
depends on the state of its human and physical capital… A
developing nations do not possess the requisite capital, n
in arms production nor arms coproduction, and that technology transfer 
and training do not transfer this capital in a self-sustainin
capabilities apparently cannot be imported; they ne
indigen
nology Advances 
The third factor that determines the success or failure of a sec
acquiring and utilizing technology is the ability of the second-tier cou
with technological advances following the technology transfer.  The l
part of an offset agreement is quickly outpaced by the technological 
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and Sain, 1992)  Thus, it is imperative for a recipient country to either acquire follow-on 
technology through future offset agreements or have in place a research and development 
ith technological 
 does not exist in 
A possible explanation of the inability of second-tier countries to keep pace with 
tec ity of R&D 
the R&D budget of all 
GAO, 2000).  As 
Markusen (2000:14) states, “American firms make most of the best weapons in the 
-tier countries 
d States and other 
d development.   
 
Defense Industrial Base 
eveloping or 
y whether the country 
ether it sought to 
integrate its defense industry globally with first-tier weapons-producing countries.  A 
aintain the 
 arms-buying 
countries in developing or maintaining their defense industrial base:  reduce or eliminate 
the dependency on foreign sources for arms and improve the export potential of their 
(R&D) infrastructure that allows the importing country to keep pace w
advances following the transfer.  However, that infrastructure typically
second-tier countries. 
hnological advances following the technology transfer is the dispar
investment between the U.S. and other countries.  For example,  
European countries in 1997 was 22 percent of the U.S. R&D budget (
world, thanks to decades of public R&D investment.”  Therefore, second
cannot hope to keep pace with the technology advances of the Unite
first-tier countries that invest substantially move in their research an
The research found the efficacy of a country’s offset policy in d
maintaining the domestic defense industrial base was determined b
sought to achieve an autarkic, self-sufficient defense industry or wh
primary goal of most buying countries in demanding offsets is to develop or m
domestic defense industrial base.  Two primary objectives motivate
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defense industry.  Although countries pursue both objectives to varying degrees, 
empirical evidence shows that tailoring offset policies in pursuit of defense autarky has 
trial integration strategies 
efficacy of second-tier country offset policies regarding defense industrial establishment 
ies summarized in 
, Turkey, South 
each of the studies is discussed in either the defense autarky or global defense industrial 
elow. 
 
tarky
not succeeded in the past while those that pursued defense indus
have been successful.   
Numerous case studies have been reported in the literature that analyze the 
and maintenance.  Therefore, this research analyzed the nine case stud
Chapter II.  Each study covered one of the following countries:  Brazil
Korea, Sweden, Singapore, Taiwan, Spain, Indonesia, and South Africa.  Additionally, 
integration section b
Defense Au  
attempting to utilize offsets to establish an autarkic defense industry capable of 
, 2007b) repeatedly 
trial base in their 
s in the defense 
industry nor have offsets advanced long-term economic or military goals.  They further 
fusion of costly state aid” (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b:19).  Table 3 summarizes the 
efficacy of Brazil, Turkey, and South Korea in utilizing offsets to achieve defense 
autarky. 
Empirical evidence suggests that second-tier weapons-producing countries 
independent production rarely succeed.  Brauer and Dunne (2007a
assert the inability of offsets to achieve a sustainable defense indus
research; offsets has not succeeded in creating new or sustainable job
note that offsets have resulted in “an increasing number of arms producers…kept alive by 
an in
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Table 3.  Efficacy of Offsets in Achieving Defense Autarky 
Country Offsets From U.S. (1993-2005)  oal Result G
Brazil Not availab
Self-sufficiency 
defense industry 
with focus on 
p
Failure: 
- 31st largest exporter (1990-2006)c 
- Military reliant on imported 
weapons and componentsb 
le 
aeros aceb 
Turkey 
$1.3 billion (15th)a Self-sufficiency defen
f
p
st arms exporter (1980-
2006)c 
orter of global arms 
c 
rter of U.S. arms 
 
se industry 
ocus on - 5
th highest impwith 
aeros ace (1977-2006)- 10th largest impo
Failure: 
- 42nd large
(1993-2005)a 
So
Ko
uth
rea
n
 
s
se
f
aerosp
e: 
- 10th highest importer of global arms  
rters (1977-2006)c 
es for Self-Reliant 
ms Productiond 
 
 $5.2 billio
 
 (4th)a Self-defen
with 
ufficiency 
 industry (1977-2006)
c 
ocus on - 22
nd largest expo
ace - Limited CapacitiAr
Failur
a ent of Commer U.S. Departm ce, 2007b 
eeman, 2007 
d B inger and Kim, 2005 
Br
 autarkic defense 
erlo-Freeman, 2007).  
During the 1980s, Brazil consistently ranked as a top 10 arms exporter, appearing to 
chnologically 
sophisticated weapons(Perlo-Freeman, 2007).  However, Brazil’s success can be traced to 
its loose export policies rather than the quality of its weapons; Brazil imposed no political 
b  Perlo-Fr
c  SIPRI, 2008 
itz
 
azil Case Study 
The case study discussed Brazil’s failed attempts to establish an
industrial base through the use of defense offsets since the 1970s (P
indicate that it had developed a robust defense industry that produced te
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conditions on its international sales and freely exported substandard weapons to Third 
World countries(Perlo-Freeman, 2007).  In fact, Brazil was a major exporter of arms to 
 the collapse of the 
e 2.  Brazil’s arms industry thrived in the 
1980s and peaked in 1983 when it exported 308% more arms than it imported.  In the 
t it imported from 
sufficient arms 
 and Brazilian AMX 
sub-sonic fighter program and the continued reliance on imports of advanced weapons 
ilitary. 
 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (Perlo-Freeman, 2007). 
However, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the cold war led to
Brazilian defense industry as shown in Figur
1990s though, the country exported only three percent of the amoun
1997 to 1999.  Other indications of Brazil’s failure to establish self-
production which were discussed in Chapter II include the Italian
and components to equip their m
 
Figure 2. Brazil Defense Exports/Imports Ratio (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
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Turkey Case Study 
The Turkey case study provides another example of a failed attempt to establish 
fense industrial base.  Turkey undertook a program of defense industrial 
developm lf-sufficiency in 
weapons production with a focus on the defense aerospace industry (Falco, 1998).  
th ient of defense offsets 
S. Department of 
 aerospace business 
achieved limited success.  Under the F-16 Peace Onyx program, Turkey embarked on a 
ircraft.  However, 
xcess production 
s since 
1999 (SIPRI, 2008). 
 self-reliant defense 
% of the ratio of 
 of the amount of 
its defense imports.  From 1977 to 2006, Turkey was the fifth highest importer of arms in 
ally, it was the 
5 (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 2007b).  Furthermore, Turkey’s percentage of world imports has declined 
since reaching 8% during the mid 1990s (SIPRI, 2008).  Finally, during the period 1980 
an autarkic de
ent through offsets in the 1980s with a goal of achieving se
During the period 1993 to 2005, Turkey was the 15  highest recip
from the United States, receiving $1.3 billion in offset agreements (U.
Commerce, 2007b).  However, Turkey’s attempt to enter the defense
ten-year plan to develop an indigenous aerospace industry and succeeded in establishing 
the domestic capacity necessary for production and assembly of the a
once demand for the F-16 waned, the aerospace industry faced e
capacity (Ilbas, 2002) and Turkey has not exported significant aerospace system
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the inability of Turkey to establish a
industry.  During the period 1982 to 1998, Turkey exported less than 1
its defense imports; even today, Turkey is still only exporting about 7%
the world, accounting for 3.5% of world demand (SIPRI, 2008); addition
10th largest importer of arms from the United States from 1993 to 200
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to 2006, Turkey ranked as the 42nd largest exporter in defense goods and services (SIPRI, 
2008).  Thefeore, the data indicate that Turkey failed to achieve its goal of establishing an 
iled to export 
e of defense items 
s exports 
and defense offsets from the United States. 
autarkic defense industrial base through the use of defense offsets:  it fa
greater than 10% of the ratio of its imports, it imports a large percentag
in relation to world demand, and it consistently ranks as a top recipient of arm
 
 
Figure 3. Turkey Defense Exports/Imports Ratio (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
 
 
   
Figure 4. Turkey Defense Imports/Global Imports (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
country to achieve 
uth Korea utilized 
of complete systems and its traditional role as a niche market supplier (Bitzinger and 
rimary weapon 
er, 2003:49).  As 
 significant public and 
private inputs in infrastructure and technology…[South Korea] still possesses only 
lim ndigenous arms 
r cost-effective.”     
South Korea’s attempt to transition to a first-tier supplier of complete weapon 
systems has not been successful in spite of the fact it was the fourth highest recipient of 
South Korea Case Study 
South Korea is the final case study illustrating the inability of a 
defense autarky through its offset policies.  Beginning in the 1970s, So
offsets to achieve defense industry independence despite its inexperience with production 
Kim, 2005).  South Korea’s strategy called for industry to develop “p
systems for core force capability” and an advanced fighter jet (Bitzing
Bitzinger and Kim (2005:183) state: “After more than 30 years of
ited capacities for self-reliant arms production, and, in general, i
production has turned out to be neither technologically practicable no
103 
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offsets during the 13-year period the Department of Commerce (2007) has collected data 
on offsets, receiving $5.2 billion in offsets agreements.  Figures 5 and 6 illustrates South 
 as it hoped.  The 
d its imports in 
Korea was the 10  highest importer of arms in the world (SIPRI, 2008) while it was the 
rd  (U.S. Department 
y did not rank in 
 
Korea’s failure to achieve meaningful defense industry self-sufficiency
country has failed to increase it exports to imports ratio above 16% an
relation to world demand have risen since 1983.  During the period 1977 to 2006, South 
th
4  largest importer of arms from the United States from 1993 to 2005
of Commerce, 2007b).  Finally, during the period 1977 to 2006, Turke
the top 20 largest exporters (SIPRI, 2008). 
 
Figure 5. South Korea Defense Exports/Imports Ratio (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. South Korea Defense Imports/Global Imports (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
  it failed to export 
e of defense items 
s exports 
and defense offsets from the United States.  Therefore, the literature indicates that the 
country’s industry possesses limited capabilities for independent production. 
Gl
Empirical evidence suggests that some second-tier weapons-producing countries 
ndustry with the 
al arms market 
as a first-tier producer and integrator of complete systems, many second-tier countries 
have established successful defense industries based on a strategy that acknowledges 
Thus, the data indicate that South Korea failed to achieve its goal of establishing 
an autarkic defense industrial base through the use of defense offsets:
greater than 16% of the ratio of its imports, it imports a large percentag
in relation to world demand, and it consistently ranks as a top recipient of arm
 
obal Defense Industrial Integration 
attempt to utilize offsets as a tool to integrate the domestic defense i
global arms market.  While the U.S. continues to dominate the internation
105 
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their second-tier status.  To an extent, the United States and other first-tier countries have 
increasingly come to rely on these second-tier countries to provide critical components.  
nabling their 
tatives, 2004).  In 
11 percent of the imports resulting from offset agreements (Department of Commerce, 
The case study of Sweden provides an illustration of a country that successfully 
em ase.  Figure 7 
summarizes the success Brazil has experienced as through its offset policies.  Similar to 
aintain an 
tly acknowledged 
t the country ‘can 
in the past’” (Bitzinger, 2003:53).  Therefore, it adjusted its defense industrial strategy to 
oduction.  Thus, 
and the need to 
ult, Sweden has 
become “one of the few second-tier arms producers to have consistently ranked among 
trate the 
as averaged 187 
percent and managed to achieve an exports to imports ratio of 850 percent in 2001.  For 
the time period 2000 to 2006, it ranks as the 7th highest exporter of defense items, trailing 
To many second-tier countries, offsets provide valuable assistance in e
industry to integrate with the global industry (U.S. House of Represen
fact, during 1993 to 2000, imports of parts and components rose 82 percent, with almost 
2004). 
ployed offsets to achieve realistic goals for its defense industrial b
Brazil and South Korea, Sweden utilized offsets as a method to develop and m
autarkic defense industrial base.  However, Swedish authorities recen
autarky is “no longer ‘economically and technically possible’ and tha
no longer afford to sustain a national defense industry to the extent that this was possible 
take advantage of its core competencies and specialize in niche pr
Sweden has shown that it understands the realities of globalization 
integrate its defense industrial base with first-tier countries.  As a res
the world’s top ten arms exporters” (Bitzinger, 2003:53).  Figures 8 and 9 illus
success Sweden has experienced.  Since 1983, its export/import ratio h
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only the first-tier nations and one other second-tier nation, the Netherlands (SIPRI, 2008).  
Finally, Figure 8 shows Sweden’s imports have been insignificant in terms of world 
 at establishing a 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Efficacy of Sweden Offset Policies (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
demand.  Therefore, the data provide an indication of Sweden’s success
robust, globally integrated defense industry. 
 
Sweden 
• Goal – global integration of defense industrial base with 1st tier 
• One of few 2nd tier countries to consistently rank as top 10 world 
exporter 
• 7th highest global exporter of arms (2000-2006) 
• Exports to imports ra o consistently above 100% since 1984 
• Imported less than 1% of world arms since 1977
ti
 
Figure 8. Sweden Defense Exports/Imports Ratio (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Sweden Defense Imports/Global Imports (SIPRI Database, 2008) 
 
al evidence of the 
zed the futility of 
production.  Its defense industry is now thriving (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b). Taiwan 
d “the original 
ed” and has instead 
(Bitzinger, 2003:39).   
Similarly, Spain recently “had to abandon dreams of an integrated, comprehensive, 
er, 2007:10).  
Indonesia experienced the collapse of its defense aerospace industry despite ambitious 
attempts to create an indigenous industry (Brauer and Dunne, 2007b).  South Africa once 
 
The experiences of other second-tier countries provide addition
realities facing these countries.  Singapore, which similarly recogni
autarkic arms production, shifted its strategy to focus on core competencies and niche 
recognized the need to adjust its defense industrial strategy as well.  As the second 
leading recipient of offsets over the past 13 years, Taiwan acknowledge
plan for independent production of weapons must be stopped or reduc
pursued a strategy to integrate its industry with foreign producers 
indigenous arms industry to be generated via arms trade offsets” (Brau
108 
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pursued a strategy of “possessing the capacity to design, develop and manufacture a 
broad array of weapon systems” (Bitzinger, 2003:45).  Over the past few years, South 
y of core competencies 
 second-tier countries 
rrent globalized 
arms market; they subsequently shifted their defense industrial strategy to specialization 
tempting to achieve 
Factors Determining the Success or Failure
Africa has abandoned this strategy in favor of one based on master
and specialization in niche programs (Bitzinger, 2003).   Thus, these
recognized the futility of indigenous, autarkic arms production in the cu
in niche markets and concentrated on core competencies rather that at
the ability to produce a broad array of weapon systems. 
  
 
ined the success 
and maintaining a 
e defense industry 
political factors include foreign government restrictions on arms trade, military and 
alliances and relationships, and government strategy for defense industry 
development. 
Overcapacity of the Defense Industry in a Declining Market 
ternational defense 
industry combined with shrinking worldwide defense expenditures.  Overcapacity and 
shrinking worldwide expenditures are especially evident in the defense aerospace 
  This section discusses economic and political factors that determ
or failure of a second-tier weapons-producing country at establishing 
defense industrial base through offsets.  The economic factors includ
overcapacity in a declining market, economies of scale, and comparative advantage.  The 
political 
 
One of the primary impediments to second-tier countries in establishing and 
maintaining a defense industrial base is the overcapacity of the in
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industry.  During the 1980s and 1990s, many industrializing countries sought to jumpstart 
their economies by establishing some level of defense aerospace industry capacity.  At 
ed the emergence 
e defense market 
excess capacity pursue declining sales opportunities (Wessner, 2007). 
pacity.  For instance, in The 
Ec ntributed to Belgium’s 
e major problems 
facing the Belgian defense industry, and that offsets, far from encouraging 
07c:19) point out, 
me countries still 
ote this.”  
They conclude by stating, “in a declining market, exit not entry has to occur.” 
Ec
lishing and 
maintaining a defense industrial base is the need of these weapon producers to achieve 
ed 
when costs are spread over more units, thus reducing the average costs of overhead and 
other fixed costs.  As shown in Table 4, the literature indicated that the use of offsets to 
the same time, the countries in Europe, Russian, and the U.S. experienc
of excess capacity as the Cold War ended (Johnson, 2007a).  Thus, th
today is characterized by intense competition as defense contractors with substantial 
Offsets have exacerbated the problem of overca
onomics of Offset, Smith (1996) points out how offsets have co
overcapacity.  He states, “overcapacity has been and remains one of th
rationalization, have served to keep inefficient producers in business and to create 
additional capacity” (Smith, 1996:7).  Thus, as Brauer and Dunne (20
with lower demand for their products, “it seems absurd then that so
intend to build the industry and that offsets are thought (and sought) to prom
 
onomies of Scale 
A second factor for second-tier countries to consider in estab
sufficient economies of scale to sustain their industries.  Economies of scale are achiev
 
 
111 
establish production facilities in the buyer country is ineffective due to the inability to 
achieve economies of scale to sustain the industries. 
ts in Literature on Economies of Scale 
Source Statement 
 
Table 4. Summary of Statemen
(P
7) 
t lead to higher unit 
st and unsustainable industries in the long-term  
erlo-Freeman, Offsets result in short production runs tha
200 co
(Markowski an
Hall, 2006:A-3
tes that investments 
ustain because export 
d is small” 
d 
“developing countries experience demonstra
in defense-related industry are difficult to s
) opportunities are limited and domestic deman
 
(Gholz, 2007:6
are considered too small 
 of scale”…a 
ased on sales 
 be overthrown by 
,7) 
for ‘national champions’ to achieve economies
country that attempts to maintain its industry b
exclusively from its domestic market “will
cost-effective imports” 
In Europe especially, domestic markets 
(Wessner, 2007
 
aintain essential :29)  Second-tier countries “need exports to m
economies of scale, or they die” 
(Flamm, 2007)
d investment that 
… nations can no 
 orders alone; the 
tial amounts of the 
 of being able to sustain its 
 alone. 
 
Prohibitively high cost of entry as a large fixe
requires sufficient economies of scale to justify
longer achieve economies of scale on domestic
only way to remain viable is to export substan
products… only the U.S. is capable
defense industry based on domestic demand
(Bitzinger and
2005:192) 
 of scale was a 
sustainable defense 
 in weapons 
inability to achieve 
 Korea defense industry 
t and uneconomical operations, 
involving small production runs, high unit costs, and 
considerable overcapacity in manufacturing” 
 Kim, 
Inability of South Korea to achieve economies
major reason it was unable to create a viable 
industrial base…strategy of self-sufficiency
production created inefficiencies due to the 
sufficient economies of scale…South
consisted of “highly inefficien
 
Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage is the third, and last, economic factor that influences the 
ability of a second-tier weapons producer to establish and maintain a defense industrial 
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base.  Landsburg (2007:1) states “a [country or company] has comparative advantage at 
producing something if [it] can produce it at lower cost than [another country or 
 of offsets to 
ve advantage while a 
e will succeed. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Statements in Literature on Comparative Advantage 
company].”  As shown in Table 5, the literature indicated that the use
establish defense autarky would be inefficient due to comparati
country that specializes in production where it has comparative advantag
Source Statement 
(Eland, 2007
ifferent nations specialize in different weapons and produce 
comparative 
 production an 
ative advantage, a 
can build most cost-
ons that can build 
:8) 
them more efficiently than other countries”…
advantage makes self-sufficiency in weapons
inefficient goal since, according to compar
“nation should produce the weapons that it 
effectively and buy the rest from friendly nati
them more efficiently” 
“D
(GAO, 1997
est of the world as 
 systems based on 
al investments in 
velopment 
) 
The U.S. has a comparative advantage over the r
a producer and integrator of complete weapon
economies of scale and scope and substanti
research and de
(U.S. 
Departm
Com
ent 
merce, 
eir comparative 
heap sources of labor in the area of of 
Second-tier countries are taking advantage of th
advantage achieved through c
2007a) niche producer and supplier of components 
(Williams, 
Maull, and E
2007) 
ucers led to the 
e UK to second-tier 
countries; many Eastern European nations, with their cheap labor 
sources are becoming suppliers to first-tier weapons producers in 
llis, 
Comparative advantage of many second-tier prod
exodus of contracts from domestic sources in th
the UK 
 
The preceding section considered economic factors that determined the success or 
failure of a second-tier weapons-producing country at establishing and maintaining a 
defense industrial base through offsets.  The next section considers political factors. 
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Foreign Government Restrictions on Arms Trade 
Protection of the domestic defense industry by many nations restricts the sales 
ucers.  Practically every country that imports arms 
ha stry at the expense of 
markets; they give preference to its domestic industry in weapons procurement and 
l sources.  Similarly, 
ean Union has 
rces (Meyer, 2007).  In 
addition, while the United States does not have an official offset policy or require offsets 
estic sourced 
ntries believe the 
et policy; the U.S. 
estic production 
requirements by moving a substantial amount of production and assembly work to the 
Un
o foreign arms 
end the United 
States rarely purchases arms from international sources without requiring the production 
of the arms in the United States (Johnson, 2007b).  As shown in Table 6, the literature 
indicates restrictions exist due to U.S. policies. 
 
opportunities of foreign weapons prod
s some measures in place that protect their domestic defense indu
international producers.  Most members of the European Union do not have open defense 
impose offsets when they agree to purchase weapons from externa
almost every country that imports defense items outside of the Europ
domestic preference policies and demand offsets from foreign sou
for its arms purchases, it does have laws that give preference to dom
products and services over those from foreign sources.  Many cou
domestic preference laws of the United States equate to a de facto offs
government requires foreign sources of weapon systems meet U.S. dom
ited States (Mowery, 2007). 
The restrictive policies of the U.S. are especially damaging t
producers due to the loss of potential sales.  Foreign governments cont
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Table 6. Summary of Statements in Literature on Government Restrictions on Arms 
Trade 
Source Statement 
(Lorell, 2002) Most U.S. built weapon systems have very few foreign components by value 
(Guay, 2007
cording to a 2005 UK Ministry of Defense White Paper, the U.S. 
e previous year 
n imports from foreign-based companies and seven percent with ) 
spent less than two percent of its budget during th
o
Ac
foreign-owned companies producing in the U.S. 
(Office of th
Under Secre
se, 
 foreign 
e awarded to 
ontracts for defense 
e 
tary 
“very few defense articles and components from
suppliers”…In 2005, the Department of Defens
of Defen
2006) 
foreign firms 2.4 percent of all defense c
articles and components.   
     
Industrial Relationships and Military Alliances 
Industrial relationships and military alliances with foreign countries is an 
g and maintaining 
r countries do not 
ction.  Therefore, 
  Offsets have 
become a vital tool second-tier countries use to establish industrial relations with foreign 
hown in Table 7, the 
ess to foreign markets for 
their defense industry through industrial relationships and military alliances. 
 
 
 
 
important factor in the ability of second-tier countries in establishin
their defense industrial base.  As was mentioned previously, second-tie
possess a defense market large enough to sustain independent produ
access to foreign markets is vital to the survival of their defense industry.
industries, especially first-tier producers of complete systems.  As s
literature indicates second-tier countries benefit through acc
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Table 7. Summary of Statements in Literature on Industrial Relationships and 
Military Alliances 
Source Statement 
(Ianakiev, 2
ility to build and/or 
main  niche specialised, companies with access to 
ernational markets”… companies should establish relations with 007) int
“defence sector’s future is conditioned by the ab
tain competitive,
first-tier countries by specializing in component and subassembly 
production 
Brauer and 
Dunne, 
aining realistic 
 and non-European 
2007b:20) 
“joining arms supply chain may…be the only rem
option for several small, industrialized European
countries” 
Markusen, 
 division of labor 
n in commercial sectors as international trade in subsystems and 
 weapons 
per-
enable countries with 
ducers at the expense 
2006:8) 
The defense industry will mirror the international
see
components occurs between second and first-tier
producers…an environment characterized by “hy
specialization” will evolve where offsets 
comparative advantage to supply first-tier pro
of traditional domestic sources 
(McLean, 
2007:10).   
. defense market and to U.S. defense technology 
dustry as it is to 
 forces” 
“Access to the U.S
is as critical to the future of the U.K. aerospace in
the operational effectiveness of the U.K. armed
(Office of 
Undersecr
of Defe
20 6
et
nse, 
:12 
 to enter the U.S. 
r non-allies; most 
ATO nations and 
artner nations” 
ary 
While there are severe restrictions on the ability
market by U.S. allies, it is even more severe fo
foreign sources for sub-contracting are from N
other “historically reliable trading p0
   
Government Strategy for Defense Industry Development 
nd-tier countries in 
ts is the 
t strategy considerations 
include securing offset agreements that complement the existing level of defense 
 
overnment intervention in the defense 
industry, and promoting the global integration of the defense industry thus disavowing an 
overly ambitious pursuit of an autarkic defense industry. 
The final political factor influencing the ability of seco
establishing and maintaining their defense industrial base though offse
government’s strategy for industry development.  Specific offse
industrial development, avoiding short-term industrial development at the expense of
long-term viability, restraining the level of g
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The first offset strategy consideration is the need to secure offset agreements that 
complement the existing level of defense industrial development.  As shown in Table 8, 
the strial development 
Table 8. Summary of Statements in Literature on Complementing Offset 
Agreements with Level of Defense Industrial Development 
 literature indicates offset agreements that complement defense indu
are vital to success. 
 
Source Statement 
(Brauer, 
7:8) 
pirically found an almost one-to-one correspondence between 
ountry’s potential to produce arms and its actual arms 
ot be built by 
try that lacks an 
pital.  Rather, the 
rior to any offset 
arently cannot be 
 
(200
“Em
a c
production”…defense industrial capability cann
infusing arms production orders on an indus
appropriate level of human and physical ca
potential to produce arms must be in place p
agreement.  Brauer concludes “capabilities app
imported; they need to be grown indigenously”
(Verzariu, 2007) 
Type of offset arrangement implemented should c
of the country’s existing industrial base to prod
and its ability to absorb the transferred state-of-th
onsider the ability 
uce the hardware 
e-art technologies 
(Jones
2007:116) 
, are those that take 
al infrastructure 
“Characteristics of successful offset programs” 
into consideration the country’s existing industri
(Meyer, 200
ustrial capacity and 
roblem with many 
licies is their government often “is often 
asking more than it can really do” 
7) 
Good offset policy is one that considers the ind
economic situation of the country.  A major p
recipient country’s po
 
The second offset strategy consideration is avoiding short-term
development at the expense of long-term viability.  Recipient governm
frequently focuses on short-term gains in industry capacity without taking into 
 industrial 
ent offset policy 
consideration long-term viability of the industry.  The failure to consider the long-term 
viability of the defense firm frequently results in negative economic impacts as firms fail 
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to secure follow-up contracts for the productive capacity.  Table 9 provides a summary of 
the literature. 
e 9. Summary of Statements in Literature on Short-term and Long-term 
Viability 
 
Tabl
Source Statement 
(Meyer, 200
“Many c have succeeded through offsets to obtain 
portant industrial plant, but once the contract has ended these 
 successful strategy 
mpetitive…and not 
and which are not 
ountries 
7:3) plants do not have enough workload”… ashould “establish industries which are truly co
establish industries which require subsidies 
economically viable” 
im
(Sköns, 200
ds to conduct a 
ect for the domestic 
ational competition” 
2:21) “realistic assessment of the long-term prosp
defense firm or technology to survive in intern
For offsets to be successful, the recipient nee
(Williams, 
0) 
ue to the inability 
incapable of 
 excess capacity 2007:2
offsets are often described as “white elephants” d
of new plants constructed to fulfill offsets where 
winning subsequent orders and thus became
(Mawdsle
Brodzka, 2
y 
0
mparable to that 
s.  In some cases, 
 production due to 
p contracts 
and 
06) 
Few firms continue to produce at a level co
experienced during the original offset transaction
they found offsets resulted in a discontinuation of
a lack of follow-u
(U.S. 
Departm
Comme
ent 
rce, 
2007a:4-14) 
are of no economic 
lish a production line for which there is no 
work after the initial production run” 
of Many foreign governments found “direct offsets value because they estab
 
 of government 
gy stands the best 
chance of success if industry, rather than government, determines how to initiate offset 
ic as well as political 
considerations, government-initiated offsets favor political over economic considerations 
(Lorell, 2002).  Table 10 provides a summary of the literature. 
 The third offset strategy consideration is restraining the level
intervention in the defense industry.  Literature indicates offset strate
agreements.  While industry-initiated offsets consider both econom
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Table 10. Summary of Statements in Literature on Government Intervention in the 
Defense Industry 
Source Statement 
(U.S. 
Department 
Commerce, 
07a:4-18)
hout regard to 
ent directed offsets result in 
ed offsets 
ternational 
innovative…“nations 
 demonstrably 
than when policies are 
of 
 
reased competition and innovation…industry believ
based on competition and best value increases in
competition by forcing subcontractors to be 
whose authorities demonstrate flexibility…gain
greater and longer term economic benefits 
rigidly and inflexibly enforced” 
20
U.S. government interagency team found offsets based on political 
factors resulted in requirements being fulfilled wit
best business practices…governm
dec
(Lorell, 
2:149-15
ercial business 
relative economic advantage, such as the 
 of best value, cost, 
150) 
200 0) competitive selection of suppliers on the basisand technological capabilities, generally played lesser roles. The 
result was often a loss in economic efficiency” 
 In government directed offsets, “standard comm
practices related to 
(Brauer, 200
nt, then offsets will be 
ide the most favorable 
owever, if offsets 
ically 
7) 
economically inefficient and will not prov
outcome for the indigenous defense industry.  H
are voluntary and initiated by industry, they may be econom
efficient 
If offsets are mandated by governme
 
on of the defense 
establish an autarkic 
ts, and learning 
pport.  Thus for a 
country to succeed in its offset strategy, it is vital that it construct a policy that enhances 
the ability of its industry to integrate within the global defense industry rather than 
attempt to establish an indigenous, self-sufficient defense industry. 
The final offset strategy consideration is the global integrati
industry.  Attempts in the past by second-tier weapons-producing countries to develop an 
autarkic defense industry inevitably met with failure.  Second-tier countries have a great 
deal of difficulty achieving economies of scale when attempting to 
defense industry; large development costs, production and tooling cos
economies result in costs well above what a second-tier country can su
 
 
119 
Bitzinger and Kim (2005) illustrate the inability of South Korea to achieve 
economies of scale as a major source of its inability to create an autarkic defense 
ind roduce its arms 
ghly inefficient and 
considerable overcapacity in manufacturing” (Bitzinger and Kim, 2005:192).  South 
stry while taking into 
005:194) note, 
d too late that they 
lack both the financial resources and the know-how to further advance indigenous 
ps only the United 
r countries offset 
This chapter provided analysis and results of the research.  First, the chapter 
ntry offset policies 
at determine the 
ology through offsets.  
Next, the chapter provided an analysis of the efficacy of second-tier arms-producing 
t determine the success or failure of these countries 
in utilizing offsets in defense industrial base establishment and maintenance.  The next 
chapter offers conclusion and recommendations. 
ustrial base.  They conclude, when South Korea attempted to p
indigenously, its industry experienced conditions marked by “hi
uneconomical operations, involving small production runs, high unit costs, and 
Korea is one of many nations that failed to tailor their defense indu
account the advantages of global integration.  As Bitzinger and Kim (2
“second-tier arms-producing states around the world have discovere
defense industrialization.”  Not even all first-tier weapons-producing countries have the 
resources to maintain an autarkic defense industrial base.  In fact, perha
States currently is capable of doing so.  Thus, it is vital to second-tie
strategy to integrate within the global defense industrial base. 
provided an analysis of the efficacy of second-tier arms-producing cou
in enabling technology acquisition and utilization followed by factors th
success or failure of these countries in acquiring and utilizing techn
country offset policies in promoting the establishment and maintenance of a defense 
industrial base followed by factors tha
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Offsets h e international arms trade landscape 
since the end of the Cold War.  More so, they have progressively increased in prevalence, 
have gained im creased in 
value relative to weapon system price.  Many second-tier arms-producing country’s offset 
to their domestic 
se.  However, the 
ins indeterminate. 
Second-tier arms producing countries tend to rely on offsets in spite of a lack of 
hus, this 
acy of second-tier 
 and in promoting 
ally, this 
research sought to document factors that determine the success or failure of offsets in 
ment and 
s for second-tier 
ucing countries in formulating offset policies and offers recommendations 
for further research. 
A major goal of weapon buyers in utilizing offsets is to enable the transfer of 
technology from weapon seller to the domestic defense industry.  Many offset recipients 
ave been a main characteristic of th
portance in relation to other competitive factors, and have in
policies seek to enable the transfer of technology from weapons sellers 
industry and to establish and maintain a domestic defense industrial ba
evidence suggests the efficacy of offsets in achieving these goals rema
conclusive evidence indicating offsets are an effective means to an end.  T
research sought to analyze the existing literature to determine the effic
country offset policy in enabling technology acquisition and utilization
the establishment and maintenance of a defense industrial base.  Addition
enabling technology acquisition and defense industrial base establish
maintenance.  This chapter provides conclusions and recommendation
weapons-prod
 
Technology Acquisition and Utilization 
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believe offsets are effective at achieving significant technology transfer.  The literature 
indicates technology transfer agreements have been ineffective and have not substantially 
 relative to first-tier 
ugh offsets is an 
The research documents three factors that determine the success or failure of a 
sec is the ability of the 
d is the ability of a 
the ability of the second-tier country to keep pace with technological advances following 
nd-tier country in 
ountry to acquire 
acquire state-of-the-art technologies through offsets.  Further, what technology is 
hile offsets do result 
nologies. The 
port controls of the 
exporting company’s government highly influence the ability of second-tier countries to 
acquire technology through offsets.  Both t
The second factor that determines the success or failure of a second-tier country 
in acquiring and utilizing technology is the ability of a second-tier country to absorb and 
improved the technology levels of the buyer’s defense industrial base
countries.  Furthermore, the research indicates technology transfer thro
inefficient method of achieving a technologically advanced defense industry. 
ond-tier country in acquiring and utilizing technology.  The first 
purchasing country to acquire state-of-the-art technology.  The secon
second-tier country to absorb and utilize the transferred technology.  The final factor is 
the technology transfer. 
The first factor that determines the success or failure of a seco
acquiring and utilizing technology is the ability of the purchasing c
state-of-the-art technology.   Research indicates second-tier countries typically do not 
acquired is of limited long-term value and comes at a high cost.  W
in technology transfer, the technology is usually older, established tech
willingness of the exporting company to release technology and the ex
ypically impede, rather than enhance, 
technology transfer. 
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utilize the transferred technology.  The research found the primary determinate of success 
in the ability of the buyer country to absorb and utilize the transferred technology is the 
ology if the industry 
an and 
physical capital, required to utilize the technology.  Therefore, technically advanced 
es with less advanced 
The third factor that determines the success or failure of a second-tier country in 
acquiring and utilizing technology is the ability of a second-tier country to keep pace with 
terature indicates 
il to achieve self-
nd make obsolete, 
e industry is 
especially adept at staying ahead of second-tier country technological advances due to its 
econd-tier countries 
er countries since their research and development 
budgets represent a fraction of first-tier budgets. 
 
fset policies in 
promoting defense industrial base establishment and maintenance is similar to that of 
promoting technology transfer – the results are predominately negative.  However, 
country’s ability to match its defense industrial capabilities with comparable technology 
transfers.  Thus, offsets typically do not succeed in transferring techn
does not possess the core competencies, as reflected by the state of the hum
countries are more successful at absorbing technology than countri
industries. 
technological advances following the technology transfer.  The li
countries are not very successful in this area; recipient countries fa
sustainable technology advances as other countries quickly outpace, a
whatever advances achieved through technology transfer.  The U.S. defens
large investments in research and development.   Conversely, most s
cannot hope to keep pace with first-ti
Defense Industrial Base Establishment and Maintenance 
The research reveals the efficacy of second-tier country of
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evidence suggests the level of development and the countries global integration plan is 
highly influential in whether or not countries succeed or fail; countries that attempt to 
tion rarely succeed 
al arms market as a 
inate the 
international arms market as a first-tier producer and integrator of complete systems, 
ustries based on a 
nd political factors, in addition to second-
tier country’s decision to pursue an autarkic or niche focused defense industrial 
 through offsets.  
y in a declining 
include foreign government restrictions on arms trade, military and political 
 and relationships, and government strategy for defense industry 
de
 establishing and 
maintaining a defense industrial base is the overcapacity of the international defense 
fense aerospace industry.  
In such a market, the entry of second-tier weapons producers seems an unwise policy 
choice; with lower demand for products in an industry faced with overcapacity, 
establish an autarkic defense industry capable of independent produc
while countries that attempt to integrate their industry with the glob
niche supplier have been successful.  While the U.S. continues to dom
many second-tier countries have established successful defense ind
strategy that acknowledges their second-tier status. 
There are numerous economic a
base, that determine the success or failure of a second-tier weapons-producing 
country at establishing and maintaining a defense industrial base
The economic factors include defense industry overcapacit
market, economies of scale, and comparative advantage.  The political factors 
alliances
velopment. 
One of the primary impediments to second-tier countries in
industry combined with shrinking worldwide defense expenditures.  Overcapacity and 
shrinking defense expenditures are especially evident in the de
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companies typically exit the market rather than enter.  As countries start up new 
production lines through offsets, the opposite is happening in many offset receiving 
ablishing and 
e need of these weapon producers to achieve 
sufficient economies of scale to sustain their industries.  An argument against offsets is 
nit costs and 
 countries are unable to 
e U.S. domestic 
market for defense products is large enough to allow its defense industry to achieve 
s-
annot.   
that influences the 
base.  Comparative advantage makes second-tier self-sufficiency in weapons production 
oduce all its 
 experience greater 
tage achieved through cheap 
sources of labor in the area of niche producer and supplier of components. 
r failure of a 
industrial base through offsets include foreign government restrictions on arms 
trade, military and political alliances and relationships, and government strategy 
countries. 
A second factor for second-tier countries to consider in est
maintaining a defense industrial base is th
offsets frequently result in short production runs that lead to higher u
unsustainable industries in the long-term.  Therefore, second-tier
achieve economies of scale due to insufficient long-term demand.  Th
economies of scale without exports.  Most other countries, especially second-tier arm
producing countries, c
Comparative advantage is the third, and last, economic factor 
ability of a second-tier weapons producer to establish and maintain a defense industrial 
an unwise and inefficient goal since these nations lack the ability to pr
weapons more cost-effectively than outside nations.  Rather countries
success when taking advantage of their comparative advan
The following political factors that determine the success o
second-tier weapons-producing country at establishing and maintaining a defense 
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for defense industry development.  Most countries utilize foreign government 
restrictions on arms trade to protect the domestic defense industry from foreign 
 domestic industry 
 purchase weapons 
s 
outside of the European Union has domestic preference policies and demand 
tates does not have 
, it does have laws 
er those from 
foreign sources.  Foreign restrictions on arms trade result in the loss of potential 
nd-tier countries. 
portant factor in 
the ability of second-tier countries in establishing and maintaining a viable 
ss a defense 
o foreign markets 
strial relationships 
and military alliances, second-tier countries gain access to foreign markets for 
strial relations with foreign industries, especially first-tier producers 
of complete systems.  In doing so, second-tier countries are hoping to secure long-
term relationships. 
competition.  European Union members give preference to its
in weapons procurement and impose offsets when they agree to
from external sources.  Similarly, almost every country that imports defense item
offsets from foreign sources.  In addition, while the United S
an official offset policy or require offsets for its arms purchases
that give preference to domestic sourced products and services ov
sales, including second-tier countries.  Therefore, in spite of the potential to 
efficiently produce marketable defense items, foreign government restrictions is a 
negative factor in defense industrial base establishment by seco
Industrial relationships with foreign countries are an im
defense industrial base.  Since second-tier countries do not posse
market large enough to sustain independent production, access t
is vital to the survival of their defense industry.  Through indu
their defense industry.  Second-tier countries have successfully used offsets to 
establish indu
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Military alliances are another important factor determining the ability of second-
tier countries in establishing and maintaining their defense industrial base.  Most 
im  with the United 
 the U.S. market by U.S. 
addition of a price differential to the price of foreign products during source selection, the 
 on reciprocity.  
aiver.  Therefore, 
or their defense 
industry, enhancing its viability.    
gh offsets is the 
gy considerations 
industrial development, avoiding short-term industrial development at the expense of 
the defense 
hus disavowing an 
set agreements that 
complement the existing level of defense industrial development is vital offset strategy.  
ent implemented should consider the ability of 
the country’s existing industrial base to produce the hardware and its ability to absorb the 
transferred state-of-the-art technologies. 
portant to second-tier countries is the ability to establish an alliance
States.  While there are severe restrictions on the ability to enter
allies, it is even more severe for non-allies.  While the Buy American Act requires the 
U.S. Secretary of Defense is authorized to waive these provisions based
Currently, most U.S. allies and friendly foreign nations received this w
these countries have greater access to an important source of exports f
The final political factor influencing the ability of second-tier countries in 
establishing and maintaining their defense industrial base thou
government’s strategy for industry development.  Specific offset strate
include securing offset agreements that complement the existing level of defense 
long-term viability, restraining the level of government intervention in 
industry, and promoting the global integration of the defense industry t
overly ambitious pursuit of an autarkic defense industry.  Securing off
To be successful, type of offset arrangem
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The second offset strategy consideration is avoiding short-term industrial 
development at the expense of long-term viability.  Recipient government offset policy 
fre out taking into 
ider the long-term 
nomic impacts as firms fail 
to secure follow-up contracts for the productive capacity. 
n is restraining the level of government 
int t chance of success if 
eements.  While 
industry-initiated offsets consider both economic as well as political considerations, 
ent 
 and innovation. 
on of the defense 
autarkic defense industry inevitably met with failure.  Second-tier countries have a great 
establish an autarkic 
ts, and learning 
pport.  Thus for a 
country to succeed in its offset strategy, it is vital that it construct a policy that enhances 
the ability of its industry to integrate within the global defense industry rather than 
attempt to establish an indigenous, self-sufficient defense industry. 
 
quently focuses on short-term gains in industry capacity with
consideration long-term viability of the industry.  The failure to cons
viability of the defense firm frequently results in negative eco
The third offset strategy consideratio
ervention in the defense industry.  Offset strategy stands the bes
industry, rather than government, determines how to initiate offset agr
government-initiated offsets favor political over economic considerations.  Governm
directed offsets frequently results in decreased competition
The final offset strategy consideration is the global integrati
industry.  Attempts in the past by second-tier weapons-producing countries to develop an 
deal of difficulty achieving economies of scale when attempting to 
defense industry; large development costs, production and tooling cos
economies result in costs well above what a second-tier country can su
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Recommendations for Further Research 
Investigating the efficacy of offsets in enabling technology transfer and defense 
 maintenance along with analyzes factors that lead to 
su ject; second-tier 
indicating offsets are an effective means to achieve their goals.  While the use of offsets 
us research projects 
ffset agreements 
ure of offets, 
researchers have been restricted to methodologies that offer conclusions and results that 
ddition to 
nsfer and defense 
ture research that 
One methodology would be to conduct a country case study that focused on the 
g a quantitative 
ustry and Security offsets 
database and CTO Data Services company offsets database.  The Department of 
mployee, would benefit future 
research greatly.  In addition, the CTO Data Services database provides a second source 
of data although the quality and quantity of the data is unknown. 
industrial base establishment and
ccess and failure in achieving the goals is an important research sub
arms producing countries demand offsets in spite of a lack of conclusive evidence 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, they have been the topic of numero
and reports.   However, due to the lack of public disclosure of data on o
and transactions due to government sensitivity and the proprietary nat
are difficult to validate.  This research experienced similar limitations in a
limitations on the availability of literature that discussed technology tra
industrial base establishment and maintenance efficacy at length.  Fu
expands on this research using different methodologies would prove valueable. 
addressing the objectives of this research effort.  Another would be to pursue quantitative 
methodologies.  Two potential sources of data necessary for conductin
research effort are the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Ind
Commerce database is restricted from release to the public.  However, access to the 
database, perhaps by a Department of Commerce e
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A second recommendation for futher research on defense offsets is to predict the 
efficacy of defense offsets for second-tier weapon-producing countries in achieving their 
sta ntial U.S./European 
mez and 
market arrangements.  The first modol is an arrangement based on European and U.S. 
ently managed 
ap exists between the 
 development 
investment with Europe dependent on European technology.  The third model is one 
s 
s enter into equal 
ation” where there 
defense market arrangement results, second-tier weapons producing countries will have 
fset policies to achieve the maximum benefit for their nation and/or 
alliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ted goals and adjusting offset policy based on each of the four pote
defense market arrangement scenarios of the future as described by Du
Jeunemaitre (2007).  Dumez and Jeunemaitre discuss four models of potential defense 
“twin markets” with common foreign policy objectives by independ
defense industries.  The second model is one where a significant g
U.S. and Europe with regards to economies of scale and research and
where European fragmentation is reduced and European mergers result in defense firm
similar in size to those in the U.S.  and European and U.S. firm
alliances.  The final model is an “Atlantic Alliance with military integr
exists a pure monopsony (Dumez and Jeunemaitre, 2007:11).  Depending on which 
to tailor their of
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